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Letter of Transmittal
February 1, 1994

To the President and Congress:
I have the honor to submit the interim Report and Recommendations
of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation,
transmitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 908 of the
Social Security Act, as amended by the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164).
This interim report responds to the questions Congress requested the
Council to consider before undertaking a basic review of the
Unemployment Compensation system. Although there is much
work that remains before the Council, we are in agreement that there
is a pressing need to reform the Extended Benefits program and that
it requires prompt Congressional consideration.
My fellow members-Owen Bieber, Thomas R. Donahue, William D.
Grossenbacher, Robert C. Mitchell, John J. Stephens, and Tommy G.
Thompson-and I look forward to continuing this important work.
Sincerely,

~
/

..

The President
rhe President of the Senate
rhe Speaker of the House of Representatives
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Section I
Recommendations and
Findings of the
Advisory
Council on
Unemployment
Compensation

Chapter 1

Introduction:
Unemployment
Insurance in a Changing
Economy

T

HE UNITED STATES' system of Unemployment Insurance,
first established in 1935 as a part of the Social Security Act,
was intended by its founders to serve both as a countercyclical
economic stabilizer for the economy and as a central part of the nation's
economic security system for workers. Almost sixty years later, the
twin goals of a strong economy and economic security for working
Americans are again at the center of the major policy debates in which
our nation is engaged. The recent debate surrounding the North
American Free Trade Agreement made it clear that the major policy
challenge of this decade is to find ways to ensure that working
Americans can achieve an acceptable degree of job and income security
while simultaneously promoting employers' capacity to compete in an
increasingly global economy.
It is likely that the high level of worker dislocation of the past
decade will continue in the near future. Defense downsizing will result
in the permanent loss of 1.5 to 2 million jobs. The continuing
globalization of the economy will cause additional restructuring in the
private sector which could result in further worker dislocation. Welfare
reform could result in millions of low-wage workers seeking
employment. These events require that the nation's Unemployment
Insurance system be on solid footing.
The Unemployment Insurance system serves as the foundation of
economic security for millions of workers who are temporarily laid off
or permanently lose their jobs. This requires that careful consideration
be given to the appropriate role for Unemployment Insurance in the
changing U.S. economy, particularly in light of the declining percentage
of the unemployed who receive UI benefits. Without a system that
replaces some portion of unemployed workers' lost earnings, economic
3
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security would prove to be an elusive goal for tens of millions of
Americans. At the same time, however, the needs of these workers and
their families must be weighed against the costs of the Unemployment
Insurance system which are financed through payroll taxes paid by
employers.
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation was
created by an Act of Congress in November 1991 to provide guidance
on this important set of issues. The Congressional mandate was a
broad one, instructing the Council "to evaluate the unemployment
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and other
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for
improvement. "
There is broad-based agreement among the members of the
Council, who represent the perspective of business, labor, and the
States that the ongoing globalization of the economy will place
increasing demands on the Unemployment Insurance system.
Unemployed workers have a growing need for services and
information. Workers need information about what types of jobs are
available and where these jobs are located, as well as information about
the skill requirements of jobs and the opportunities that are available
for acquiring those skills. It is the view of the Council that in addition
to providing income maintenance to unemployed workers, the
Unemployment Insurance system must develop a capacity to provide
this information in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The system
must become a facilitator of change, helping to get people back to
productive work as quickly as possible.
Although the Council did not hold its first meeting until May 1993,
its members have been able to reach substantial agreement on some
areas of the Unemployment Insurance system that are in most urgent
need of reform. This report, the first of three annual reports,
summarizes the preliminary findings and recommendations of the
Council.
In light of the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger
on in a meaningful way during the most recent recession, there is a
clear and immediate need for reform of the program. Consequently,
the Council has focused most of its deliberations and recommendations
to date on that aspect of the Unemployment Insurance system. The
Council strongly urges timely Congressional consideration of these
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recommendations, because it believes that the country needs a
functioning Extended Benefits program. The Council believes that
Congressional extension of Extended Benefits to provide assistance to
the long as well as the short-term unemployed could reduce the need
for emergency extensions of unemployment benefits in the future.
In addition to reform of the Extended Benefits program, this report
addresses some specific issues on which Congress asked the Council
to comment. In particular, the report makes recommendations on the
following: the use of sub-state or regional data for triggering Extended
Benefits, the work search requirements of the Extended Benefits
program, and the treatment of alien agricultural workers with H2-A
visas by the Unemployment Insurance system.
Together, these recommendations represent a first step in a
comprehensive rethinking of the Unemployment Insurance system as
the foundation of the job and income security for u.s. workers. Much
work remains. Over the course of the next year, the Council intends to
re-examine the fundamental assumptions on which the Unemployment
Insurance system was founded. This reconsideration of the most basic
questions regarding the system is especially important, given the
profound changes that have taken place in the U.S. economy.
The labor market, in particular, has undergone significant change
since the inception of the Unemployment Insurance program. Married
men who are the sole breadwinners for their families no longer
constitute the majority of the work force. Taken together, women,
,'ontingent workers, part-time workers, temporary workers, single
. leads of households, and single individuals now make up the majority
of workers. The Council intends to give careful consideration to the
responsibilities that the Unemployment Insurance system has to serve
these individuals.
Among the other matters which the Council will address are the
following: the experience rating mechanism used to finance the
Unemployment Insurance system, the nature of the federal-state
partnership upon which the system is based, administrative funding
dnd efficiency within the system, and the extent to which the system
an and should be expanded beyond income maintenance for the
unemployed and turned toward re-employment of the unemployed.
Furthermore, the Council intends to continue its deliberations about the
funding and solvency of the Unemployment Insurance system. Future
reports will make recommendations to ensure that the solvency of the
system, and therefore its ability to provide adequate coverage and
benefits to eligible unemployed workers, is ensured.

Chapter 2

Recommendations and
Findings
PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM

Findings
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed
since the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length
of time that individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply
during recessions, has also increased slowly but steadily during nonrecessionary times. Workers who have been laid off from their jobs are
now less likely to return to their previous jobs than has historically
been the case. This indicates an increase in the level of long-term
unemployment in the economy.
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as
a means of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term
unemployment. The system was never intended to combat long-term
unemployment. The purpose of the Unemployment Insurance system,
and in particular the Extended Benefits program, must be expanded if
the system is to deal effectively with the changing nature of
unemployment. In doing so, however, careful consideration must be
given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expenditures
for combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the
Unemployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It must also be
recognized that while Unemployment Insurance reform is a necessary
component of developing effective strategies for dealing with long-term
unemployment, other reforms--especially among programs for
dislocated workers-will be needed.

7
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Recommendation
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded
to enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system to
provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well as
short-term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are longterm unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment
Insurance benefits, provided they are participating in job search
activities or in education and training activities, where available and
suitable, that enhance their re-employment prospects. To maintain
the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance income support system,
a separate funding source should be used to finance job search and
education and training activities for long-term unemployed workers. 1

THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS
Findings
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits
by the unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least
1947-the first year for which data on the system are available. In
addition to the long-term downward trend in receipt of benefits, there
was a pronounced decline in the early 1980s, just as the economy
entered a recession.
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance
system are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused
by the changing demographics of the labor force, the changing
industrial and geographic composition of employment, and a decline
in the solvency of states' Unemployment Insurance trust funds. The
sharp decline in receipt of benefits in the early 1980s appears to be
attributable primarily to changes in federal policies which encouraged
the states to increase the solvency of their trust funds by restricting
eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits and! or increasing

lOne member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers'
payroll taxes should not be used as the funding source. Another member
emphasizes that such a recommendation must be considered in the context of
reform of dislocated workers programs.
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employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts to improve
their trust fund solvency.
The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured
by the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of
Unemployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of
individuals in UI-covered employment. Since the inception of the
Extended Benefits program in 1970, states have been required to use the
state IUR as a "trigger" that determines whether or not individuals who
have exhausted their regular UI benefits are eligible for Extended
Benefits.
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the
Unemployment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less
reliable indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that
Extended Benefits will trigger on in states with high unemployment.
In addition, just as the IUR was experiencing a marked decline during
the recession of the 1980s, the "trigger" level required to become eligible
for Extended Benefits was raised.
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in
the trigger level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits
program to trigger on as unemployment continued to rise during this
most recent recession. As a result, Congress found it necessary to pass
a series of emergency extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits.
The Council finds that emergency extensions of Unemployment
Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient since they are neither welltimed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the
Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next recession, in
order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation.
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be
used to trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect
measures exist, the best available evidence about the condition of the
overall labor market within a state is the Total Unemployment Rate
(TUR), which indicates the supply of individuals who are unable to
find work. It should be noted, however, that, beginning in January
1994, the TUR rates will be affected by the redesign of the Current
Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market
conditions that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the
Adjusted Insured Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR
adjusted to include those individuals who have exhausted their regular
Unemployment Insurance benefits.
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are
available on some measures of local labor market conditions, these data

10
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are extremely unreliable measures of the true conditions that the
unemployed face.
Furthermore, there would be substantial
administrative difficulties in using either substate or regional data for
triggering Extended Benefits.
The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers
that have been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are
available within a state, the thresholds built into the triggers have been
problematic. These thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate
(whether measured by the IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that
prevailed over the previous two-year period (by a factor of 120 percent
for the IUR or 110 percent for the TUR).
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number
of states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession.
However, the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which
Extended Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest
unemployment, as well as hastening the point at which such states
trigger off the Extended Benefits program. As a result, the thresholds
have caused dissatisfaction among some with the operation of the
program since those states suffering the most economic hardship are
triggered on for the shortest period of time. This problem could be
addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers at a
slightly higher level.
Recommendation
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing
need to reform the Extended Benefits program.
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended
Benefits program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjusted
total unemployment rate (STUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured
before the Current Population Survey redesign. 2 Two members of
the Council recommend that each state should have the choice of
using either the STUR trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold
requirement of 110 percent above either of the two previous years, or
an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold requirement
of 120 percent over the previous two year period.

2Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should be set at
6.5 percent regardless of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that
result from the redesign of the Current Population Survey.
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The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms
promptly.
Although the Council has reservations about the
inefficient targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend
the existing Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six
month period to provide a bridge program until these Extended
Benefits reforms can be implemented.3

Recommendation
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the
purpose of determining whether or not Extended Benefits are
available within a given area.

FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM
Findings
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment
Insurance system as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing nature
of unemployment are compromised by incorporating its trust funds
into the unified federal budget. While the flow of funds into the
Extended Unemployment Compensation account may be adequate to
finance the recommended Extended Benefits reform, such reform is
complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment Insurance trust
funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members of the
Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this
situation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts
should be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires
careful consideration within a broader context. The Council intends to
revisit this issue in its future deliberations.

3'fwo members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency
Unemployment Compensation should be extended.
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Recommendation
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's
recommendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest
increase in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500.4

WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS
Findings
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended
Benefits program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions,
those individuals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a
minimum wage job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits.
While the Council understands that recipients of both regular and
extended Unemployment Insurance benefits have an obligation to
search actively for work and accept appropriate job offers, the Council
finds the current federal requirements to be excessively onerous. All
states use a "suitability" test to determine the jobs which claimants are
required to accept to remain eligible for benefits. This test gives states
the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by claimants, while
protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job skills by
permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The states are in a better
position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets.

Recommendation
The federal requirement that individuals who are reCeIVIng
Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is offered,
or become ineligible for benefits, should be eliminated. Each state
should be allowed to determine an appropriate work search test,
based on the conditions of its labor market.

4Two members object to this recommendation.
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STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY

Findings
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment
Insurance benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least
partially caused by the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds.
During the past decade, many states with low or negative trust fund
reserves have found themselves in the position of either having to
increase taxes on employers in the midst of an economic downturn, or
having to take measures to restrict eligibility and benefits for the
unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-as-you-go funding
has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment Insurance
system.
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation
to begin to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment
Insurance system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good
economic times and a drawing down of reserves during recessions.
The Council finds, however, that any move toward creating federal
guidelines for states' Unemployment Insurance trust fund accounts
must be carefully weighed. Otherwise, there will be a risk of creating
undue incentives for the states to restrict the eligibility and level of
Unemployment Insurance benefits in order to achieve the solvency
guidelines. The Council intends to make specific recommendations on
this issue in future reports.

FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

Findings
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of
alien agricultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system.
Currently, the wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas
are exempt from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This
exemption is scheduled to expire on January I, 1995.
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against
continuing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien
agricultural workers are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on
whom FUTA taxes must be paid. This cost differential may create an

14
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incentive for substitution of foreign workers for U.S. workers, which
argues in favor of repeal of the exemption. Furthermore, the process
of certifying workers and issuing H2-A visas imposes costs on the
federal and state governments that have the responsibility for
overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of the cost of
the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since FUTA
serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of
H2-A workers from FUTA taxation.
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive
Unemployment Insurance benefits since their visas require that they
return to their country of origin within ten days after their employment
terminates. Consequently, these individuals cannot meet the "available
for work" test of the Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA
taxes would be imposed upon the wages of individuals who cannot
receive Unemployment Insurance benefits, which argues against
imposing the FUTA tax on their wages.
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA
taxation of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against
continuing that exemption.
Recommendation
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers
(H2-A workers) should be subject to FUTA taxes.

Section II
Issues and Trends in
Unemployment
Insurance

Chapter 3

Overview*

T

HE FEDERAL-STATE Unemployment Insurance (UI)
system, created in 1935, is designed to fulfill two primary
objectives: (1) to provide temporary wage replacement for unemployed
workers who have demonstrated a strong attachment to the labor force
and (2) to assist in stabilizing the national economy during periods of
cyclical economic downturn. The federal-state nature of the system
assigns different responsibilities to the federal and state governments.
Although broad federal laws ensure consistency in those areas where
uniformity is considered essential, states determine most of the details
of program operations and administration. As a result, many features
of the system vary greatly across states.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
Currently, three separate, but interrelated, programs provide
income support to qualified unemployed workers: (1) permanent
regular state UI programs, (2) the federal-state Extended Benefits
program, and (3) the temporary federal Emergency Unemployment
Compensation program. The characteristics of the three components of
the UI system are discussed in more detail below. Figure 3-1 illustrates
the benefits paid under each of the three components of the UI system
over time.

Regular State Unemployment Insurance
Regular state Unemployment Insurance programs generally
provide up to 26 weeks of benefits to qualified unemployed workers.
Eligibility is determined according to specific state laws on an
individual basis, with the duration and amount of benefits based upon

"There are two principal authors of the chapters contained in Section II of
this report. Amy B. Chasanov is primarily responsible for Chapters 7 and 8,
and Daniel P. McMurrer is primarily responsible for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. They
co-authored Chapter 3.
17
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FIGURE 3-1
UI BENEFITS PAID IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS, 1948-1992
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an individual's recent employment and earnings history. State taxes on
employers! finance most benefits paid under the program? Tax rates
vary among employers within the same state and are based partially
upon the level of past VI claims that were made by an employer's
former employees.
Federal taxes imposed under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) pay for the administration of state VI
programs (as well as the federal share of the Extended Benefits
program). The total amount paid by the regular program is cyclical in
nature, with the level increasing as the number of unemployed increase
during periods of economic downturn. During 1992, over $25 billion
were paid in benefits.

Federal-State Extended Benefits
The federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program provides up to
13 additional weeks of benefits to individuals who have exhausted their
regular VI benefits. Half of the cost of EB benefits is financed by the
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federal government, and half is paid by the state distributing the
benefits. Benefit amounts under EB correspond to the same level of
benefits received in the regular state programs. This extension in
benefit duration is available to individuals only when a measure of
state unemployment rises above a given level. Most states currently
use the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) as the only "trigger" for the
program. Because the IUR is determined by the number of regular UI
claimants in a state, eligibility for EB in most states is affected directly
by states' UI eligibility laws. Thus, a decline in the percentage of the
unemployed who receive regular UI benefits has directly contributed
to the reduction in the number of states in which EB is available.

Emergency Unemployment Compensation
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program is
a temporary program similar to a number of past emergency programs
enacted during periods of recession. 3 EUC was enacted by Congress
in November 1991 and has been extended on a number of different
occasions since that time. It is scheduled to terminate in February 1994.
The number of additional weeks of benefits that are made available
under EUe depends upon three factors: (1) when the claimant first
applied for EUe, (2) the state total unemployment rate, and (3) the
national total unemployment rate. EUe claimants must meet state
eligibility criteria, as well as additional federal requirements regarding
employment history and work search. The EUC program has, in
essence, provided states with the opportunity to use EVC in place of
EB. Because the costs of Eue benefits are financed entirely by the
federal government, and only 50 percent of EB costs are borne by the
federal government, all states have taken advantage of the option of
providing EUC rather than EB. Thus, in the wake of the most recent
recession, EUe has almost entirely supplanted EB. To date, EUe has
cost over $23 billion, with a significant percentage of that amount
financed out of general revenues.

THE UNEMPLOYED POPULATION
In comparison with the civilian labor force, there are some slight
differences in the unemployed (see Table 3-1). In particular, younger
individuals, males, and blacks are disproportionately represented
among the unemployed. In comparison with the unemployed
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TABLE 3-1
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN 1992
Civilian
Labor Force

Total
Unemployed

UI
Claimants

Age
16 to 34
33 to 54
55 and over

38%
38%
12%

59%
33%
8%

43%
45%
12%

Men
Women

54%
46%

57%
43%

60%
40%

White
Black

89%
11%

78%
22%

N/A

Gender

Race

Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services.

population, individuals who make VI claims tend to be older, with men
also represented disproportionately.
A number of trends among the unemployed are evident. The
percentage of VI claimants who have exhausted regular VI benefits
during recessions has been increasing since 1970 (see Figure 3-2). The
average duration of unemployment spells has increased,
as has the percentage of individuals experiencing particularly long
unemployment spells (see Figure 3-3). With regard to reasons for
unemployment, the number of job losers on layoff has increased over
time, while the percentage of the unemployed who are new entrants to
the labor force has decreased (see Figure 3-4). The impact that broad
demographic changes in the labor force have had on the VI system is
discussed further in Chapter 4.
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TRENDS IN REGULAR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE PROGRAMS
There are a number of dimensions along which the regular VI
system can be examined. Included among these dimensions are the
following: (1) the percent of the labor force that is covered under the
VI program, (2) the standards regarding eligibility for VI benefits
among the unemployed, (3) the percent of the unemployed who
actually receive VI benefits, (4) the amount of VI benefits received, and
(5) the duration of the benefits. Each of these elements are discussed
in greater detail below.
FIGURE 3-2
PERCENTAGE OF CLAIMANTS EXHAUSTING REGULAR UI BENEFITS,
1940-1992
100% ,--.,..---,...----y-----r----r-------r---.---.,..-,------,r--1 100 %

BO%

BO%

60%

40%

40%

20%

20%

O%LU~LL~LU~LLLW~~LULU~LLUU~~LWLU~LLLU~O%

1940

1950

1960

1970

Year
Lines represent recessions at peak.
Source: UI Fi naneial Data Handbook.
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FIGURE 3-3
EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS, 1947-1992
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(1993).

Coverage
The percentage of the workforce covered by the VI system (i.e.,
those jobs in which the employer pays VI taxes on a worker's wage)
has increased over time (see Figure 3-5). The most recent significant
increases in coverage were legislated in the 1970s, when a number of
groups were covered for the first time, including state and local
government employees, many household workers, and employees of
small businesses. Now VI coverage is almost universal, extending to
over 90 percent of all civilian employment in the Vnited States. This
includes almost all wage and salaried workers, representing 106 million
individuals. The only major group that currently remains uncovered
is the self-employed.
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FIGURE 3-4
UNEMPLOYMENT BY REASON, 1967-1992

100%

100%

75%

75%

50%

50%

25%

25%

0%

67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91

0%

Year
IIIJob losers on layoff mOther job losers
•

Reentrants

Source:

/SJJob leavers

.New entrants

Economic Report of the President (1993. Table B-39).

Eligibility
While the eligibility criteria for UI benefits among unemployed
workers varies from state to state, there are three general principles that
apply in all states: (1) individuals must earn a certain minimum amount
in a given period of time in order to be eligible; (2) eligible individuals
must be willing and able to work, with most states also requiring that
they actively seek work; and (3) eligible individuals must have lost
their jobs through no fault of their own. This latter requirement tends
to exclude most job quitters and individuals who have been fired for
cause.
Although many state policy changes have tended to restrict
eligibility, individual wages have simultaneously increased as a result
of inflation, thereby allowing more individuals to reach the minimum
earnings threshold. Estimates suggest that these two trends have
almost canceled one another, with eligibility remaining fairly constant
at approximately 43 percent of the unemployed. 4
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almost canceled one another, with eligibility remaining fairly constant
at approximately 43 percent of the unemployed. 4
FIGURE 3-5
ANNUAL COVERED EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT, 1947-1992
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Year
Source:
Economic Report of the President (1993), and
Employment and Wages, BLS/USDOL.

Receipt of Benefits
The percentage of unemployed workers who receive
unemployment insurance benefits under regular state programs has
exhibited two significant trends: (1) it has declined slowly but
consistently since the 19405; and (2) it dropped dramatically between
1980 and 1984, and has remained at a low rate throughout the 1980s
and early 19905. The causes and implications of these trends are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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Level of Benefits
The weekly level of benefits (i.e., the weekly benefit amount) that
an individual is eligible to receive is determined by individual state
formulae that are based upon the prior recent earnings of that
individual. Each state also has a minimum and maximum level of
weekly benefits that can be received. The average benefit received by
workers in 1992 was approximately $173 per week.s
The replacement rate, defined as the level of UI benefits paid
divided by wages in UI-covered employment, is often used as a
measure of the capacity of the UI system to replace an individual's preunemployment wages. The replacement rate has been quite constant
over time, remaining around 35 percent (see Figure 3-6). This average,
however, masks significant variation across states, with the replacement
rate ranging in 1992 from a low of 27.5 percent in California to a high
of 49.5 percent in Hawaii (see Table 3-2). In addition, there is
significant variation across individuals within states, with UI benefits
typically replacing a higher percentage of lost earnings for low-income
individuals than for high-income individuals. 6 Similarly, the average
level of weekly benefits varies across states, ranging in 1992 from a low
of $83 in Puerto Rico to a high of $239 in Hawaii (see Table 3-3).
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Duration of Benefits
In most states, the potential duration of benefits for an individual
is calculated based upon that individual's recent eamings. 7 There is
substantial uniformity across states with regard to the maximum
duration of VI benefits, with all but three states providing for a
maximum of 26 weeks of benefits in 1993.8 In general, the national
average of potential maximum duration has gradually increased over
time, as has the average duration of individual unemployment spells
(see Figure 3-7).
FIGURE 3-6
AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TOTAL
COVERED WEEKLY WAGES, 1938-1992
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Source: ur Financial Data Handbook.
1983 and 1984 figures were recalculated and substituted for erroneous data.
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TABLE 3-2
AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TOTAL COVERED
WAGES, BY STATE IN 1992

California
Louisiana
Indiana
Alaska
New Hampshire
Tennessee
Alabama
Puerto Rico
New York
Georgia
Missouri
Arizona
Connecticut
Mississippi
District of Columbia
Nebraska
Illinois
Kentucky
South Carolina
New Mexico
Virginia
Maryland
Delaware
Nevada
Florida
Washington
Vermont

27.5
27.8
28.1
28.1
28.5
28.7
28.8
31.1
31.8
32.0
32.6
33.4
33.7
33.8
34.0
34.4
34.4
34.7
35.2
35.3
35.4
35.5
35.6
35.6
35.9
36.1
36.2

Source: VI Financial Data and Handbook.

New Jersey
Texas
Virgin Islands
Montana
Colorado
North Carolina
South Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
West Virginia
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Idaho
Michigan
Maine
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
North Dakota
Minnesota
Vtah
Iowa
Kansas
Rhode Island
Hawaii

36.4
36.9
37.2
37.2
37.4
37.4
37.9
38.4
38.5
38.7
39.1
39.5
39.8
39.9
40.0
40.2
40.6
40.8
40.9
40.9
41.0
42.3
42.7
42.9
44.6
49.5
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TABLE 3-3
WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT, BY STATE IN 1992

Hawaii
District of Columbia
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Michigan
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Pennsylvania
Minnesota
New York
Illinois
Delaware
Maryland
Ohio
Kansas
Colorado
Texas
Washington
Wisconsin
Utah
Oregon
Iowa
Alaska
Nevada
Maine
Virginia
Wyoming

$239.80
$227.72
$226.31
$224.88
$211.29
$210.78
$206.09
$200.92
$198.09
$197.42
$183.21
$181.02
$180.25
$179.87
$179.06
$177.54
$176.11
$175.62
$175.46
$174.49
$171.81
$170.38
$169.92
$167.89
$166.73
$164.15
$163.42

West Virginia
Virgin Islands
Oklahoma
North Carolina
Florida
Idaho
Vermont
California
Arkansas
Georgia
Arizona
North Dakota
Missouri
Kentucky
South Carolina
New Mexico
New Hampshire
Montana
Nebraska
South Dakota
Indiana
Tennessee
Mississippi
Alabama
Louisiana
Puerto Rico

Source: USDOL/ETAjUIS/Division of Actuarial Services.

$162.74
$160.58
$159.50
$158.50
$158.01
$156.22
$155.31
$152.07
$150.63
$148.17
$146.75
$146.22
$146.07
$144.43
$142.89
$138.28
$135.55
$134.62
$132.95
$127.84
$125.98
$123.85
$122.62
$120.95
$118.06
$83.50
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FIGURE 3-7
DURATION OF VI BENEFITS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
(IN WEEKS), 1948-1992
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Chapter 4

Trends in Unemployment
Insurance Recipiency

T

HE PERCENTAGE of unemployed workers who receive UI
benefits under regular state programs has exhibited two
significant trends: (1) the national recipiency percentage has declined
slowly, but consistently, since the 1940s; and (2) the recipiency
percentage dropped dramatically between 1980 and 1984 and has
remained at a low rate throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
These declines have raised considerable concern, in large part
because they threaten to undermine the two primary functions of the
UI system: to provide partial wage replacement for unemployed
workers, and to counter economic downturns by automatically
pumping more money into the economy when the unemployment rate
is high. Because the Insured Unemployment Rate (lUR) is the primary
mechanism through which the Extended Benefits program (EB) is
activated during recessions, the decline in the IUR, reflecting the decline
in recipiency, has also weakened the countercyclical effectiveness of the
EB component of the UI program.
The two declines cited above likely have been caused by a
combination of factors that tend to have similar effects upon the UI
system. It is probable that the long-term decline partially is a result of
broad shifts in the demographics of the labor market, coupled with
industrial shifts and increases in UI coverage. To the extent that the
percentage of the unemployed receiving UI benefits has decreased over
the long term, the UI program has become unresponsive to the needs
of a growing portion of the unemployed population.
A number of researchers have worked to identify the causes of the
recent, more short-term decline in national UI recipiency. Four factors
have been identified as the primary causes, although the results have
not been wholly consistent and researchers have had substantial
difficulty in separating the effects fully. First, policy changes were
made on both the federal and state levels that appear to have reduced
recipiency. Second, an increasing percentage of the unemployed live in
states where UI recipiency is consistently below the national average.
31
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Third, the lUlionized percentage of the work force, where UI claims
rates historically have been high, has declined. Fourth, the percentage
of the work force employed in the manufacturing sector, where VI
claims rates also have been high, has declined, as well.

RECIPIENCY TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
There are two primary measures of recipiency. The first measure
is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) to the Total
Unemployment Rate (TVR),l and the second is the ratio of UI claimants
(IU) to the total number of unemployed (TV). 2 Both these ratios have
shown a long-term decline and a more short-term decline (see Figure
4-1). Recipiency measures also vary considerably across states, with the
ratio of claimants to total unemployed ranging from 21 percent in
Virginia to 60 percent in Alaska during 1992 (see Table 4-1). An
alternative measure of recipiency, the ratio of UI claimants to total job
losers, has also demonstrated both long-term and short-term declines
(see Figure 4-2).
In an analysis of the characteristics of all unemployed individuals
who were not receiving benefits, the Congressional Research Service
found that such individuals were typically young, did not head
families, and were not the primary source of income within their
families. Generally, they have lower than average incomes both before
and after the unemployment spell. The study also found that, as
expected, as attachment to the labor market decreases, likelihood of
receiving VI benefits also falls. Even among those individuals who had
been employed full-time for a full year before the beginning of their
unemployment spell, however, only 42 percent of such individuals
receive benefits. 3
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FIGURE 4-1
RECIPIENCY RATES FOR REGULAR STATE UI PROGRAMS, 1947-1992
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Sources: UI Financial Data Handbook and Economic Report of the President (1993).
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TABLE 4-1
RATIO OF UI CLAIMANTS TO TOTAL UNEMPLOYED,
BY STATE IN 1992

Virginia
New Hampshire
Florida
Texas
Indiana
West Virginia
South Dakota
Oklahoma
Colorado
Arizona
New Mexico
Louisiana
Georgia
Alabama
Utah
Mississippi
Puerto Rico
North Carolina
Kentucky
Ohio
North Dakota
Wyoming
Michigan
South Carolina
Montana
Illinois

20.7%
23.6%
24.5%
24.6%
24.7%
24.9%
25.0%
26.4%
27.3%
27.9%
28.4%
28.6%
28.9%
29.0%
29.4%
29.6%
29.7%
30.6%
30.8%
33.1%
33.1%
33.9%
33.9%
34.4%
34.6%
34.7%

Maryland
Tennessee
Minnesota
Iowa
Nebraska
Massachusetts
Arkansas
Missouri
New York
New Jersey
California
Delaware
Maine
Pennsylvania
Kansas
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Idaho
Oregon
Nevada
Washington
Wisconsin
Vermont
Hawaii
District of Columbia
Alaska

35.0%
37.2%
37.3%
37.4%
37.6%
38.9%
39.2%
39.4%
39.7%
39.9%
40.7%
40.7%
43.0%
44.6%
44.9%
45.2%
46.2%
46.7%
46.9%
46.9%
47.1%
47.4%
48.3%
50.0%
51.2%
60.0%

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area UI Statistics and National

Office of Unemployment Insurance, Weekly Report.
Note: Data for the Virgin Islands are not available.
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FIGURE 4·2
RATIO OF VI CLAIMANTS TO JOB LOSERS, 1967·1992

1.2 '-~'----'--------'-'------------'-'1.2
1.0

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2
~-W~-L~~-L~~~~-L~~~~-L~O.O

0.0
1967

1972

1977

1982

1987

1992

Year
Lines represent recessions at peak.
Source: Economic Report of the President (1993).
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Long-Term Trends
In the long term, the IUR/TUR has dropped approximately
60 percent since 1947, and the IV lTU has declined approximately
40 percent over the same period. Vntil1980, both ratios displayed an
overall downward trend, with some upward movement during periods
of high unemployment. Figure 4-3 illustrates the relationship between
the IVR/TUR and the unemployment rate over time. These trends
suggest that the VI program has been serving an ever-decreasing
percentage of the unemployed, with periodic increases during
recessions, largely a result of recessionary increases in the percentage
of the unemployed who are job losers.
FIGURE 4-3
RECIPIENCY RATES FOR REGULAR STATE VI PROGRAMS AND TOTAL
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE,1947-1992
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Short-Term Trends
The long-term decline in VI reClplency was combined with a
pronounced drop in both measures of recipiency during the early 1980s.
By 1984, the number of unemployed collecting VI as a percentage of
total unemployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded
percentage since 1947, when such data were first collected. The ratio
has increased slightly since 1984, but has remained lower than its
historical average. This period is the first one during which recipiency
measures did not increase significantly as the unemployment rate
peaked. This represents a fundamental shift away from the dynamic
trends that had marked the VI program since its inception. 4
The declines in VI recipiency are potentially significant for a
number of reasons. First, they threaten to undermine the two primary
functions of the VI system: to provide partial wage replacement for
unemployed workers and to counter economic downturns by
automatically pumping more money into the economy during periods
of high unemployment. The effectiveness of the system in performing
these two functions is a direct function of the percentage of the
unemployed who are served by the program. To the extent the
program serves a decreasing percentage of the unemployed, the
system's capacity to perform its two primary functions is eroded.
Further, the decline of the IVR relative to total unemployment has
weakened the countercyclical effectiveness of the VI system as a whole,
because the IUR is the primary mechanism through which the EB
program is activated during recessions. Thus, the decline in the IVR
has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of states in which
EB is made available during recessions. s

CAUSES OF THE LONG-TERM DECLINE IN
RECIPIENCY
While there is relatively little research that has examined the longterm phenomenon, the research that does exist suggests that the longterm decline is primarily a result of two factors: (1) changes in the
demographic composition of the labor force and (2) increases in VI
coverage. It is likely that both of these factors have served generally to
reduce the percentage of eligible workers who apply for VI benefits.
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Broad Demographic Changes
Burtless and Saks suggest that a primary cause of the decline in the
IV lTV before 1980 was the changing demographic composition of the
jobless. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as many women and young
workers from the baby boom generation entered the labor force, they
also became a higher percentage of the unemployed. As a result, men
of prime working age, who are the most likely to receive VI benefits,
declined considerably as a percentage of the unemployed. Burtless and
Saks find that such demographic changes explain a large percentage of
the decline in the IV lTV ratio before 1980.
While the demographic changes described by Burtless and Saks
declined in their impact after 1980, other demographic changes have
continued or even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps the most
significant change is the continuing increase in the number of twoearner families. Although no empirical research has addressed this
issue, it is likely that the increase in two-earner households has reduced
the need of some workers to apply for VI benefits upon becoming
unemployed. Thus, it is possible that various broad demographic
.changes have continued to have a negative impact upon VI recipiency.

Increases in VI Coverage
As noted above, significant increases in VI coverage occurred
during the 1970s. It is likely that these newly covered employees were
less likely to make VI claims than previously covered groupS.6 If this
is true, then, all else being equal, the number of VI claimants as a
percentage of VI-covered jobs (i.e., the IVR) would decline simply as a
result of the increased coverage of the system. Burtless and Saks
suggest that the IVR may have declined by between 0.5 and 0.8
percentage points because of the extensions in coverage in the 1970s.
Such a decline would account for a large percentage of the decline in
the IVR/TUR over this period.

Decline in Manufacturing
The shift of workers from manufacturing and other industries with
high VI recipiency rates was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a
primary cause of the long-term decline in recipiency, although they
report that it is quite difficult to estimate with precision the magnitude
of this effect. As discussed below, the decline in manufacturing also
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has been identified as a significant cause of the decline during the
1980s?

CAUSES OF THE SHORT-TERM DECLINE IN RECIPIENCY
Considerable inconsistency continues to exist in the research
exanUning the decline in VI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s.
The variability of the results is a strong indication of the difficulty that
researchers have had in quantifying the impacts of various factors.
Four primary factors have emerged as the most common explanations
of the short-term decline in recipiency: (1) federal and state policy
changes, (2) population shifts to states with traditionally low VI claims
rates, (3) the decline in the unionized percentage of the work force, and
(4) the decline in the manufacturing sector of the economy. It is likely
that a combination of some or all of these factors contributed
significantly to the short-term decline.

Policy Changes
During the 1980s, a number of changes in federal and state law
appear to have contributed to the reduction in the percentage of the
unemployed who received unemployment benefits. Overall, the u.s.
General Accounting Office (GAO) finds that policies designed to
improve the solvency of state trust funds had the effect of reducing VI
recipiency among unemployed individuals. 8
Most significantly,
numerous state laws were changed to restrict eligibility and reduce
benefit levels. In part, these state laws were in response to federal
policies that provided incentives to states to adopt more restrictive
legislation for regular state unemployment programs. A number of
federal laws, most notably the decision to tax UI benefits, directly
reduced the value of unemployment benefit levels.
Federal Policies

During the 1980s, a number of significant changes were made in
federal regulations governing state VI trust funds. Beginning in 1982,
states were required to repay federal loans to their trust funds with
interest (previously, the loans had been interest-free and there was some
uncertainty regarding whether repayment would be required at all), and
states with loans were required to adopt other specific measures to
ensure solvency. Overall, these changes provided incentives to states
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to avoid the need for future loans by reducing the scope of state
programs. In addition, states were given other direct incentives, linked
to federal EB funds, to tighten VI eligibility requirements and to reduce
VI benefits. Taken as a whole, these federal policy changes were
reflected to some extent in the state policy changes discussed below.
Federal laws also were changed in ways that directly affected the
recipiency rate. In 1979, VI benefits were partially taxed for the first
time, and in 1986, all unemployment benefits became subject to taxation.
States also were required to reduce or eliminate VI payments to
unemployed workers receiving pensions or Social Security payments.
Corson and Nicholson find that, overall, between 11 percent and 23
percent of the total decline can be directly attributed to various federal
policy changes. Specifically, between 11 and 16 percent is due to partial
taxation of benefits and up to 7 percent to less generous EB programs. 9
State Policies
During the 1980s, many states adopted tighter monetary eligibility
standards or stricter disqualification provisions for their regular VI
programs. The GAO reports that 44 states tightened their standards in
one or both of these regards between 1981 and 1987. It is likely that
many of these state changes came about in response to the federal
incentives to tighten eligibility discussed above, although it is
impossible to determine the precise impact that changes in federal
legislation alone had on the policy decisions of states. Some research
has found that these and other changes in state policy account for a
significant percentage of the decline in recipiency. Corson and
Nicholson find that 21 percent to 54 percent of the decline in recipiency
is attributable to state policy changes. Specifically, the decline is due to
the following: 9 to 11 percent to increases in denial rates for
disqualifying income, 3 to 11 percent to increases in the minimum
earnings required to qualify for VI, 2 to 11 percent to increases in the
denial rate for misconduct, up to 13 percent to changes in voluntary
separation standards, 5 percent to reductions in maximum duration of
benefits, and 2 to 4 percent to changes in wage replacement rates.lO
They also find that the IV lTV increased between 1 percent and 13
percent as a result of reductions in work test denials, partially canceling
the effects of the other factorsY
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Burtless and Saks also conclude that state legislative and
administrative changes are the primary cause of the decline in
recipiency, but they do not present estimates of the magnitude of the
effects of these changes. 12
Baldwin and McHugh's findings suggest that state policy changes
account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency rates between 1979
and 1990. 13 An updated work by Baldwin, however, found sharp
reductions in the apparent effects of state policy changes. 14 Baldwin
and McHugh suggested that the decline can be attributed to the
following: 21 percent to increases in the minimum earnings required to
qualify for VI, 16 percent to increases in the earnings required to
qualify for the maximum benefit, 8 percent to increases in the number
of states with disqualification periods for job quitters, 7 percent to
increases in the number of states with disqualification periods for
refusal of suitable work, and 1 percent to increases in the number of
states with right-to-work laws. 15
Blank and Card, however, found little evidence that state policy
changes had any impact on recipiency. They did find that individual
eligibility for VI benefits appeared to decline slightly as a result of
tighter state eligibility standards, although these effects were offset by
increasing wage levels. 16

Population Shifts
An increasing share of U.S. unemployment is located in Southern
and Mountain states, where the IV /TU ratio consistently has been
lower than the national average. Thus, as the percentage of national
unemployment located in these states increases, the national IV /TU
ratio would be expected to fall accordingly. This is a long-term
demographic trend, occurring throughout the last three decades and
continuing into the present. Blank and Card found that these regional
shifts in population accounted for approximately 50 percent of the
decline in the national IV /TU ratio between 1977 and 1987. Vroman
asserts that 25 percent is a more appropriate figure, and Corson and
Nicholson attribute 16 percent of the variation to geographic population
shiftsP These analyses do not, however, explain the underlying
variations in IV /TU across states that have actually caused the national
rate to be affected by interstate migrations. It is quite likely that much
of this variation can be attributed to the state policy differences
discussed above. The exact extent to which this is the case, however,
has not yet been determined.
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Decline in Unionization
In recent years, the percentage of workers who are members of
unions has declined significantly. Between 1979 and 1988, the
unionization percentage decreased 25 percent. 18 Because unions have
traditionally represented a powerful source of information regarding
available benefits for unemployed workers, it is possible that the decline
in union membership exacerbated any existing information problem
among the unemployed. In addition, unions have often facilitated the
filing of members' VI claims by helping to guide them through the VI
system.
Finally, many unions' members are only eligible for
supplemental unemployment benefits paid by their union if they apply
for regular VI.
Blank and Card attribute 25 percent of the decline in recipiency to
the decline in unionization. Baldwin and McHugh assign 29 percent of
the reduction in recipiency to the decline in unionization. Vroman also
points to the potential importance of the unions' information role by
noting that the most important reason for nonapplication for VI benefits
by unemployed individuals is their belief that they are ineligible for VI.
If individuals' understanding of eligibility is incorrect, then eligible
workers may not be applying because they believe they are ineligible. 19

Decline in Manufacturing Sector
As noted above, Burtless and Saks suggest that industrial shifts
contributed to the long-term decline in recipiency. This trend continued
in the 1980s, as manufacturing as a percentage of total employment fell
by 22 percent between 1979 and 1990. This factor has been identified
as a significant cause of the short-term decline, as well. Corson and
Nicholson find that between 4 percent and 18 percent of the decrease
in the VI claims ratio can be attributed to the decline in the
manufacturing sector, while Baldwin and McHugh attribute 16 percent
of the total decline in IV jW to this factor. In addition, Corson and
Nicholson note that an unemployed worker previously employed in
manufacturing is 25 percent more likely to collect VI than a similar
worker from another industry. These findings are partially called into
question, however, in analyses by Corson and Rangarajan, and Baldwin.
Both find that a decrease in manufacturing employment actually leads
to an increase in the IUR. 20
Overall, it should be noted that because unions traditionally have
been composed disproportionately of workers in the manufacturing
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sector, the decline in manufacturing is closely linked to the decline in
unionization. Thus, the effects of these factors may be difficult to
separate.

Chapter 5

Dislocated Workers

A

s NEW COMMODITIES and technologies develop, the
. nature of the economy changes, with some individuals
losing their jobs as a result. Such workers are termed "dislocated"
workers. While dislocated workers come from all fields, individuals
who work in declining industries are particularly likely to be
dislocated. In addition, workers in fields that are adversely affected by
changes in public policy are also vulnerable to dislocation. In the
coming years, it is likely that two particular government policies will
increase the number of worker dislocations. Some increases in
dislocated workers are expected to result from the implementation of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Reductions in
spending in the defense sector also are likely to dislocate a significant
number of workers.
Economists often argue that some worker dislocation is efficient,
because it serves to direct human resources to those areas where they
are most useful and valuable. This efficiency, however, imposes a
significant burden upon those individual workers who are dislocated.
In recognition of the individual costs that are borne by dislocated
workers, a number of government programs exist that are designed to
meet their needs, providing income support and reemployment
services. The UI program represents the primary source of income
support. Currently, the Trade Adjustment Assistance program and the
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance program
represent the primary complements to the UI program for dislocated
workers, providing training and job search assistance, as well as
additional income support.
WORKER DISLOCATION: DEFINITIONS
Before beginning a direct discussion of worker dislocation, it is
important to recognize that not all analysts agree on how to define
dislocated workers. As a result, the number and characteristics of
workers who are actually classified as dislocated vary greatly,
depending upon the specific definition that is chosen. Some suggest
that all workers who lose a job because of a plant closing or permanent
45

46

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

layoff should be considered dislocated, while others believe that a
worker must also have had a stable previous employment history in
order to be classified as dislocated. This latter definition, with a
requirement that a worker has been employed in the previous job for
at least three years, is the one generally used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, as well as many other researchers, in their analyses of
dislocated workers.
Nevertheless, it is in many ways instructive to consider all workers
who have permanently lost their jobs, regardless of their job tenure, in
order to understand the relationship between various lengths of job
tenure and the experiences of dislocated workers. Indeed, analysis
reveals that half of all dislocated workers were with their previous
employer for fewer than three years. Therefore, this chapter considers
all dislocated workers, regardless of their job tenure.

EXTENT OF WORKER DISLOCATION
Many have come to believe that the extent of dislocation among
American workers has increased in recent years. The long-term shift
in employment opportunities from the manufacturing sector to the
service sector reflects a turmoil in the labor market that is likely to
cause worker dislocations. Further, indirect measures of dislocation
have increased in recent years. Both the average duration of
unemployment spells and the percentage of unemployed workers who
are unemployed for extended periods of time have increased
throughout the last decades. 1 At the same time, the unemployment
rate has been steadily increasing, with some economists attributing a
percentage of this rise to increases in the number of dislocated
workers.2 Indeed, as indicated in Figure 3-3, the relationship between
the unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment is
quite a strong one. In addition, the number of permanent separations
as a percentage of job losses has increased over time. 3
In an effort to achieve a direct measure of the number of dislocated
workers over time, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted
a major study of the characteristics and the experience of workers who
were identified as having been dislocated during the 1980s. 4 The CBO
found that approximately two million workers in the United States lost
or left a job each year in the 1980s because of a plant closing, an
employer going out of business, a layoff from which they were not
recalled, or other similar reason. The number of such dislocated
workers each year was reflective of the condition of the economy, with
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numbers ranging from 1.5 million in the relatively strong labor market
of 1988 to 2.7 million in the recession year of 1982.5 Analysis reveals
that much of the cyclical variation over the decade was a result of
workers who lost jobs because of "slack work," rather than the closing
of plants or abolition of jobs or shifts. Thus, the number of workers
who were dislocated because their plant was closed or job abolished
remained generally constant throughout the decade, slightly below one
million workers per year, despite the variations in the overall
unemployment rate.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DISLOCATED WORKERS
Under any broad definition, dislocated workers are a
heterogeneous population with varied backgrounds, characteristics, and
needs for adjustment assistance. Indeed, the heterogeneity of this
population is increasing, as greater numbers of white collar and
nonmanufacturing workers are being dislocated. In large part,
however, the characteristics of those workers with the greatest need for
assistance in finding new employment still can be distinguished from
the characteristics of dislocated workers who are unlikely to encounter
significant difficulty in finding reemployment.

Dislocated Workers in General
Despite the relationship noted above between the condition of the
economy and the number of dislocated workers, the characteristics of
dislocated workers tend to remain generally consistent, regardless of
the prevailing economic conditions. A high percentage of dislocated
workers have lost their jobs in goods-producing industries, although
the percentage of service workers who were dislocated increased
throughout the 1980s, rising from approximately 40 percent to 50
percent of all dislocated workers. Despite the decrease in the
percentage of dislocated workers from goods~producing industries,
dislocation among such workers is still twice the rate among workers
from other industries. In addition, a number of other individual factors
affect the likelihood of a worker becoming dislocated. The CBO notes
that workers who have not finished high school are twice as likely to
be dislocated as workers with a college degree. Younger workers are
more likely to become dislocated than older workers. Overall, despite
these differences in risk of dislocation by age, education level, and
industry, the characteristics of the population of dislocated workers
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generally resemble the characteristics of the civilian labor force as a
whole.

Reemployment Difficulty Among Dislocated Workers
It is important to recognize that labor market experiences vary
significantly among those workers who become dislocated. Those
workers who (1) incur the largest wage losses, (2) are jobless for
extended periods, or (3) do not find reemployment at all tend to be
disproportionately the least well educated, the oldest, and those with
the longest tenure with their previous employer. Statistical analysis to
isolate the effect of each characteristic shows that age and years of
schooling have the largest effects upon dislocated workers' likelihoods
of each of these three forms of reemployment difficulty. In addition,
among dislocated workers, females and minorities are significantly
more likely to have such difficulties than males and whites, regardless
of economic conditions. The variety of difficulties experienced by some
dislocated workers is discussed in greater detail in the following
section.

CONSEQUENCES OF DISLOCATION
The experiences of dislocated workers varies considerably. Some
find new jobs at comparable wages with little difficulty. A significant
percentage of those dislocated, however, exhaust their VI benefits,
experience long spells of unemployment, and/ or receive lower wages
in their new jobs. There is evidence that workers who are dislocated
from their jobs experience long spells of unemployment and that many
suffer significant losses in earnings. 6 The CBO finds that even one to
three years after being dislocated/ half of the workers who had lost
jobs either are not working or have new jobs that pay less than 80
percent of their prior earnings. 8 On the other hand, almost one quarter
of dislocated workers receive an increase in earnings of at least 20
percent by that point. Those who suffer lower earnings tended to take
longer to find a job than other dislocated workers. While those who
receive a significant increase in earnings are unemployed for an average
of 14 weeks, those whose earnings decline by more than 20 percent are
jobless for an average of 26 weeks. Dislocated workers who eventually
find reemployment are unemployed for an average of 20 weeks, while
all dislocated workers, including those with continuing unemployment
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spells at the time of the survey, are unemployed for an average of 29
weeks. 9
As noted above, the workers who experience the most difficulty
tend to be disproportionately older, less educated, and to have longer
previous job tenure. For example,
..

Workers over the age of 60 are unemployed for an average of
53 weeks, with only 32 percent able to find reemployment.

..

Workers with more than 10 years of job tenure are unemployed
for an average of 37 weeks, with only 65 percent able to find
reemployment. 10

..

Dislocated workers who have not completed high school (20
percent) are unemployed for an average of 39 weeks, with only
58 percent able to find reemployment.

It is also important to note that the condition of the economy
seems to play little role in improving the prospects of comparable
reemployment for those workers who incurred substantial decreases in
earnings. Although the average duration of unemployment for all
workers fell from almost 30 weeks during the recession year of 1981 to
15 weeks in 1988, the percentage of reemployed dislocated workers
whose earnings fell by at least 20 percent remained generally constant.

PROGRAMS SERVING DISLOCATED WORKERS
The UI program represents the primary means of income support
for covered dislocated workers who are seeking new employment. In
order to respond to the more specific needs that these workers have, an
array of other programs currently exists; these programs serve
primarily either to supplement the UI benefits that are available to
dislocated workers or to complement those benefits by providing
training or other reemployment assistance. Currently, the Department
of Labor is in the process of developing a plan to create a
comprehensive worker adjustment program, with existing worker
adjustment programs consolidated into one.
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Unemployment Insurance
The VI program is the primary source of income support to
dislocated workers. In addition, it provides benefits to other workers
who lose their jobs. While dislocated workers comprise approximately
20 percent of the unemployed, approximately 80 percent of dislocated
workers are served by the VI program.
In general, dislocated workers are much more likely to exhaust
their VI benefits before they find a job. During the 1980s, more than
half of all dislocated workers who received ill benefits exhausted them,
while only about one-third of VI recipients as a whole exhausted
benefits.
As expected, the characteristics of workers and the
circumstances of dislocation that are associated with lengthy spells of
unemployment are also associated with a greater probability of
exhausting benefits.

Other Programs
Although ill represents the primary source of benefits for
dislocated workers, it serves all covered workers who lose their jobs;
therefore, it is not tailored to the needs of dislocated workers.
Historically, there have been numerous other programs that have been
targeted at specific groups of workers. Today, the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) program and the Economic Dislocation and Worker
Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) program represent two significant
sources of reemployment assistance for dislocated workers in general.
In addition to these programs, programs similar to EDWAA have been
implemented to serve workers affected by the Clean Air Act and cuts
in defense spending. Further, a number of other smaller programs exist
that have eligibility standards restricted to workers who are in a single
industry or who are affected by more narrow government policiesY

Trade Adjustment Assistance
TAA is the largest of the special programs created to assist
displaced workers whose job losses are associated with federal policies,
with recent annual expenditures ranging from $150 to $250 million.
The program provides assistance to workers who are unemployed as
a result of import competition. In order to qualify for assistance,
workers from a firm must petition for certification. Certification criteria
require that a significant share of the firm be threatened with
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dislocation; sales or production have decreased; and increased imports
have "contributed importantly" to the reductions in employment, sales,
or production'. The certification process for TAA services can be a
lengthy one, requiring an intensive investigation by representatives of
the Department of LaborY
Cash benefits are available under TAA for certified workers after
their VI benefits have been eXhausted. The weekly TAA benefit level
is available for up to 52 weeks after VI eXhaustion if the worker is
participating in an approved training program. Generally, weekly TAA
benefits are equal to an individual's weekly VI benefit level. In 1991,
25,000 displaced workers received cash assistance totalling $116 million,
in an average amount of $170 per week and average duration of 23
weeks per individual. More than 85 percent of these recipients came
from the manufacturing sector Y
In addition to cash assistance, various types of reemployment
assistance increasingly have been available since the 1980s, with
training now an entitlement for eligible workers and mandatory for
those workers who receive cash benefits under TAA and have not
received a waiver from the training requirement. A recent evaluation
of the TAA program, however, found no statistically reliable evidence
that TAA-provided training has a substantial positive impact upon
employment and earnings for participants in the first three years
following an initial VI claim.14

Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance
EDWAA amended Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) in 1988. Vnder the program, states are allocated federal funds
to provide training and related services to dislocated workers. Funds
are distributed to states on the basis of various measures of state
unemployment. The criteria for being designated "dislocated" (and
therefore eligible for services) under EDWAA are quite broad.
Generally, the criteria require only that workers be either terminated,
laid off, or long-term unemployed and have limited opportunities for
future employment in their previous industry, occupation, or
community. This assessment is made on the state or local level.
Available funding under EDWAA, however, is insufficient to cover
all eligible workers. For 1993, $517 million was appropriated to
EDWAA, which is estimated to be sufficient to allow approximately 10
percent of all dislocated workers to receive services.

52

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

EDWAA funds are generally used to provide classroom training,
on-the-job training, and job search assistance to program participants.
Few participants receive income support under EDWAA. Relocation
assistance was also authorized by EDWAA, but is offered by very few
of the local programs. Overall, no evaluations of the impact of the
program have been conducted.

TAA and EDWAA: A Comparison
EDWAA and TAA represent two significantly different approaches
to addressing the problem of dislocated workers. TAA targets a more
narrow population affected by one government policy. Further, TAA
provides cash assistance that resembles an extension of VI payments to
affected individuals. EDWAA, on the other hand, primarily provides
training and other reemployment services, with little cash assistance.
Responding to a Bush Administration proposal that the two
programs be replaced by a single, comprehensive program, the GAO
testified that one significant problem in both EDWAA and TAA was
their inability to respond to the needs of dislocated workers in a timely
manner. 1S Because research indicates that workers who receive timely
assistance are more likely to find rapid reemployment, this limitation
is significant. Further, the GAO found that coordination between the
two programs is limited, despite legislative mandates for such
coordination. 16

Additional Programs
Programs similar to EDWAA also have been enacted under JTPA
to serve workers whose job losses are related to the implementation of
the Clean Air Act or to cuts in defense spending. The Clean Air
Employment Transition Assistance program was authorized under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, with a total of $250 million
available for 1992 through 1997. The Defense Conversion Adjustment
program of 1990 authorized a total of $150 million to assist dislocated
defense workers through 1997. The Defense Diversification Adjustment
program also provides reemployment assistance to dislocated defense
workers, with $75 million appropriated to the program in 1993. The
services provided under these programs are also similar to those
provided by EDWAA.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF DISLOCATED WORKER
PROGRAMS
Three primary types of reemployment services have been made
available to unemployed workers: job search assistance (JSA), on-the-job
training (OJT), and classroom training. Each of these also has been
made available specifically to dislocated workers through various
programs, including those discussed above. JSA is designed primarily
to assist unemployed workers in developing effective job search skills.
OJT provides for the acquisition of firm-specific skills that can only be
attained on the job. Finally, classroom training provides formal
classroom-style instruction that is intended to assist unemployed
workers in the development of skills that are potentially of interest to
a variety of employers. 17

Job Search Assistance
A variety of social experiments, demonstrations, and other projects
provide consistent evidence that JSA is the most cost-effective
reemployment service. It has positive effects on a number of labor
market outcomes, including earnings, placement, and employment
rates. As a result, JSA programs typically result in a reduction in the
length of time that workers receive VI benefits. JSA has two other
significant advantages over classroom training and OJT. First, it allows
for quick intervention after a plant closing or layoff. Second, the cost
per worker is quite low in comparison with training programs. In view
of the difficulty involved in early identification of unemployed workers
who are likely to encounter significant reemployment difficulties, the
low cost of JSA makes it feasible to provide such services early, even
to those workers who prove to have little difficulty in finding new
comparable employment.

On-the-Job Training
Findings regarding OJT are somewhat mixed. When provided in
programs focused specifically upon worker training, rather than
reemployment of unemployed workers, OJT generally has been found
to be quite effective, with positive effects upon employment and
earnings. When targeted upon the specific clientele of dislocated
workers, however, such positive effects are no longer evident. Most
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studies do agree that, becaus~ of its significantly higher cost, it is not
as cost-effective as JSA programs.

Classroom Training
Evidence regarding classroom training suggests that its effects are
no greater than those realized through the provision of JSA alone. As
a result, the significantly higher cost of classroom training suggests that
it is not typically a viable alternative to JSA. A recently completed
evaluation of JTPA confirmed the negative findings regarding the
impact of classroom training programs, finding clear supporting
evidence that such programs do not generally have the desired impact
for unemployed workers. 18

CURRENT PROPOSALS
A number of proposals have been made regarding new programs
or techniques for serving workers who are identified as dislocated.
Three of these are discussed briefly below.

Comprehensive Worker Adjustment Program
Currently, the Department of Labor is developing a comprehensive·
worker adjustment program, into which existing dislocated worker
programs would be consolidated. Services would be available to all
dislocated workers, regardless of the cause of dislocation. In large part,
such a program is being developed as an effort to reduce the
complexity and fragmentation of the currently existing system. A
unified program should be both easier and less expensive to administer,
thereby making it possible for more dislocated workers to receive
reemployment services. 19

Profiling
Profiling is a technique designed to identify those new VI
recipients who are likely to be dislocated, to encounter reemployment
difficulties, and to exhaust their VI benefits. Such workers are then
referred to reemployment services by their fifth week after filing for VI
benefits. The profiling program serves to link VI with other efforts to
assist dislocated workers.
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Restructuring the Extended Benefits Program
Finally, dislocated workers could be served through a restructuring
of the existing federal-state Extended Benefits program. This option is
discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6

Extended Benefits
Reform

T

HERE are four fundamental answers to the question of
what the purpose of an extended VI benefits program
should be. First, the program could be countercyclical in nature,
paying benefits during cyclical economic downturns. This is the
current orientation of the program. Second, the program could address
some problems associated with structural unemployment, paying
benefits to individuals identified as dislocated workers. Third, the
program could combine the above goals, paying benefits to both
cyclically and structurally unemployed workers. Fourth, it could be
determined that there is no need for any form of extended VI benefits.
There are a number of more detailed policy questions that must be
answered, with the specific questions dependent upon the particular
purpose that is chosen for the program. All of these are discussed in
additional detail in the text that follows.
Vnder a countercyclical extended VI benefits program, decisions
must be made regarding the following general issues: (1) the method
of determining periods of high cyclical unemployment, (2) the
requirements that should be imposed upon benefit recipients, (3) the
method of financing the program, and (4) the determination of the
potential duration of benefits.
Vnder an extended VI benefits program directed at dislocated
workers, decisions must be made regarding the following general
issues: (1) the identification of "dislocated workers" (which can include
the issue of requirements imposed upon benefit recipients), (2) the
method of financing the program, and (3) the determination of the
potential duration of benefits.
If both general goals are pursued in an extended VI benefits
program, a decision must be made regarding the relationship between
the two components of the program, in addition to the other specific
policy options. Finally, if it is determined that there is no need for an
automatic extended VI benefits program, then no additional policy
decisions must be made.
57
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CURRENT STATUS OF EXTENDED BENEFITS
EB was enacted in 1970 as an attempt to create a permanent
program that would automatically provide VI benefits for extended
durations during periods of particularly high unemployment in a state.
Such a program, when functioning effectively, would make additional
benefits available to many regular VI exhaustees and would provide an
added countercyclical stimulus for the macroeconomy in periods of
recession. As designed, therefore, EB would eliminate the need for the
emergency supplemental VI benefits programs that have been enacted
by Congress on an ad hoc basis during every economic downturn since
1958. Despite the presence of EB, however, the implementation of
emergency benefits programs (such as EVC) during recessions has
continued. This suggests that the EB program, as currently structured,
is incapable of performing its intended function during periods of
significant unemployment.
As a result, a number of proposals to reform EB triggers have been
pu t forth. In large part, the impetus for these proposals has come from
two factors: (1) the decrease in availability of EB in recent years and
(2) the increase in structural unemployment, which has led to
suggestions that the EB program be targeted more directly at those
workers who were dislocated by structural economic adjustments.
These two factors are discussed below.

Decreased EB Availability
Fewer states have been eligible for benefits under the EB program
during the last decade. This was particularly evident during the last
recession. This has resulted in a decline in the effectiveness of EB as
a countercyclical device. Two factors related to the definition of the EB
trigger have caused a decline in the availability of EB. First, federal
legislation in 1981 required that state IVR triggers be raised from four
percent to five percent. Second, a combination of factors during the
early 1980s worked simultaneously to reduce the scope of most regular
state VI programs.! As a result of these changes, the percentage of the
unemployed who received benefits decreased, which directly reduced
the IVR. Thus, state IVRs were generally in decline at the same time
the federal government increased the minimum IVR required to be
eligible for EB.
Consequently, EB first payments declined dramatically. Estimates
suggest that first payments in the recession years of 1982 and 1983
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declined by as much as 55 percent from the level that would have been
expected based upon the earlier historical relationship between EB and
the TUR. 2 During the 1991 recession, EB was activated only briefly in
eight states, and then only because high cyclical unemployment
coincided with high seasonal unemployment. 3 The Congressional
Research Service noted that "the availability of EB in so few states
during the trough of the recession indicated to many that the currentlaw EB trigger was too restrictive."4 Overall, the increased IUR trigger
rate, in combination with lower state IURs, greatly reduced the
effectiveness of the EB program.

Increased Structural Unemployment
Policy interest has also turned to the potential use of the EB
program as one means of addressing some of the problems associated
with increases in structural unemployment and worker dislocation.
Figure 3-3 provides additional detail on the increase in the duration of
unemployment spells. Triggers could be selected that would increase
the targeting of EB benefits to dislocated workers who find themselves
unemployed due to structural changes in the economy. This could also
allow the variety of existing programs that currently serve various
specific dislocated populations to be consolidated. s

REFORMING EXTENDED BENEFITS
In considering reform of the EB program, the most fundamental
issue that must be addressed is the question of the purpose of the
program. The answer to the question has profound implications for all
other elements of the program, including its eligibility criteria,
financing mechanism, requirements that are imposed upon recipients,
and potential duration and amount of benefits.
Although the regular VI program would continue to provide
income support to eligible jobless individuals, two primary goals could
be pursued in an EB program. First, the program could perform a
countercyclical role by paying benefits during cyclical economic
downturns. This would provide an added macroeconomic stimulus
during such periods. To accomplish such a purpose, determination of
eligibility for the payment of benefits would be based upon the
condition of the economy in the nation, a region, a state, or a substate
area.
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Alternatively, the program could address some problems associated
with structural tmemployment by providing a longer period of UI
payments to individuals who have been dislocated from their jobs as
a result of structural changes in the economy.6 In this view of the
program, the primary determining factor for benefits would be
individual attributes 7 or actions, rather than the condition of the
economy. It is true, however, that the capacity of the economy to
create new jobs has an effect upon the severity of the dislocated worker
problem. A shift of this nature in the EB program would represent a
major change in the orientation of the program.
It should be recognized that it is not necessary to select only one
of the two program goals described above. There are numerous
combinations that could be created that would make possible the
pursuit of both of the goals within the same program. For example,
one such solution would be a two-pronged extended benefits system,
in which extended benefits trigger "on" according to economic
conditions, but are made available also to individuals identified as
dislocated workers. In order to clarify the issues as fully as possible,
however, much of the remainder of this chapter separates the
discussion of the countercyclical focus of EB and the dislocated worker
focus of EB.
Finally, it should be noted that before determining the goal(s) of
an extended benefits program, a basic decision must be made on
whether or not UI benefits should ever be extended beyond the basiC
26 weeks. The regular ur system itself represents a significant
countercyclical structure, pumping billions of additional dollars into the
economy during periods of recession. Some analysts question whether
any additional unemployment benefit program is required. Further, EB
is certainly not the only means through which the economy can be
stimulated during recessions, nor is it necessarily the most effective
method. Indeed, macroeconomic evidence from past decades indicates
that any government efforts to fine-tune the economy through measures
such as countercyclical stimuli are usually ineffective. This line of
reasoning suggests that individual income maintenance should perhaps
be the primary goal of an EB program. If one believes, however, that
unemployment is not exclusively involuntary, then even the income
maintenance goal can be troublesome, because extended benefits make
it easier for a worker to be more selective in considering job offers, and,
therefore, increase the likelihood that workers will remain tmemployed
for longer durations. Evidence regarding the effect of potential benefit
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duration on length of unemployment spells is discussed in greater
detail below.
Thus, if an extended benefits program is to be maintained, there
are primarily two potential targets for benefits: (1) individuals who
suffer long unemployment spells during periods of recessionary
economic conditions and/or (2) workers who are dislocated. The EB
program would be structured and function in a different manner
depending upon which group(s) is/are selected as the target
population. The principal program goals and policy options that are
associated with targeting benefits at one or both of these groups are
discussed in greater detail below. In addition, a brief, systematic menu
of policy options for EB reform is presented in Appendix A.

EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A COUNTERCYCLICAL
PROGRAM
Under the conception of EB as a countercyclical program, extended
benefits are targeted to UI recipients who exhaust their regular benefits
during periods of economic downturn. Thus, benefits under such a
program are contingent upon cyclical changes within the
macroeconomy. This provides additional income maintenance for
eligible unemployed individuals during those periods and in those
areas where jobs are particularly difficult to find. Moreover, if benefits
under EB are paid out of a trust fund that was established earlier, a
countercyclical EB program provides additional stimulus to the
economy.
In shaping a countercyclical EB program, a number of fundamental
policy questions must be answered. These questions fall into four
broad categories: (1) how should the activation of the program be
triggered, (2) what requirements should be imposed upon benefit
recipients, (3) how should the program be financed, and (4) how should
the potential duration of benefits be determined? Each of these
questions is discussed in greater detail below.

Triggers
Under a countercyclical EB program, some method must exist that
allows the identification of those cyclical periods when, given the goals
that are defined for the system, it is appropriate for the EB program to
pay benefits to those individuals who are identified as eligible. Under
the current EB program, this has been accomplished through the use of

62

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

what is commonly referred to as a "trigger," which is structured to
activate the payment of EB benefits when the trigger exceeds a defined
level.
Overall, four questions must be answered regarding the triggering
mechanism that is selected for a countercyclical EB program: (1) what
measure of economic or labor market conditions should be used as the
triggering mechanism, (2) at what level should the trigger be set,
(3) should the conditions that activate the program be measured
absolutely (i.e., without regard to conditions in previous time periods)
or relatively (i.e., by taking previous conditions into consideration in
determining whether the program triggers "on"), and (4) at what
geographic level should triggers be measured and examined? Each of
these four questions is discussed in greater detail in the sections below.
It is particularly important to separate the question of the most
appropriate triggering mechanism from the question of the level at
which that mechanism should be set in order to trigger "on." The first
issue is a function of the particular element of the condition of the
economy that is deemed most appropriate to measure, combined with
the reliability and availability of the data. The second is primarily a
function of the desired level of EB availability and the level of benefits
that can be financed.
Overall, there is no triggering mechanism that is necessarily
incompatible with any given level of either recipiency or program
expenditures. 8 It is generally possible to achieve similar levels of
recipiency (and, therefore, expenditures) under all potential trigger
measures. Because it is, therefore, possible to design a trigger to yield
almost any level of recipiency I expenditure, the two issues should be
considered independently. The merits and demerits of the each
alternative triggering measure should be considered without regard to
the desired level of recipiency I expenditure and the desired level of
recipiency I expenditure should be determined without regard for the
EB triggering mechanism that is selected.

Triggering Mechanism
Currently, the EB program requires states to trigger EB "on" if the
IUR exceeds 5 percent and is 120 percent higher than the average IUR
during the corresponding time period over the previous two years.
The IUR is the required trigger that has been used throughout the
history of the EB program. In March 1993, however, states were given
the option of triggering EB "on" if the TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is
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110 percent higher than during the same time period in either of the
previous two years. Only seven states have currently implemented this
optional trigger. It is likely that this is partially a result of the short
period of time in which the TUR trigger option has been available,
combined with the existence of EVe. EVe is 100 percent funded by
the federal government and has therefore rendered EB, which is only
50 percent federally financed, an unattractive alternative from the
states' perspective.
In considering the appropriateness of the various possible
triggering measures, two requirements must be met: (1) the data must
accurately reflect those economic or labor market conditions that have
been identified as the proper criteria for determining whether the
program should be triggered "on" and (2) the data must be reliable and
available on a timely basis.
There are four measures that could potentially meet one or both of
the requirements noted above. These measures are as follows: (1) the
IVR, (2) the TUR, (3) the percentage of individuals who exhaust VI
benefits, and (4) the deviation from the existing employment trend.
Each of these is discussed in greater detail below.

Insured Unemployment Rate. For the purposes of triggering EB,
the IVR has been defined as the 13-week moving average of continuing
regular VI claims divided by the average number of individuals in VIcovered employment over the first four of the last six completed
quarters. Thus, this measure is an output of the VI system itself. The
IVR could, therefore, be considered an appropriate trigger, if it is
determined that the conditions that activate extended benefits should
be based on the experience of only the VI-covered population, and that
the conditions facing individuals who are not covered by the VI system
are different and/or are generally irrelevant for a program covering
individuals who are already eligible for VI.
As noted above, it is currently difficult for a state to qualify for EB
under the existing IUR trigger. While the significant decline in EB
eligibility is primarily a reflection of the level at which the IVR trigger
has been set, it is also partially a result of a flaw that renders the IVR
an imperfect measure of labor market conditions. The IUR is not
exclusively a reflection of the condition of the labor market, but is also
affected by factors that can change independently of labor market
conditions. Such factors can include changes in state VI eligibility
policy, participation rates in the VI program, and various demographic
changes.
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The potential impact of changes in state VI eligibility policies is a
particularly clear example of the ability of factors external to the labor
market to affect' the IVR. Because the state IVR is directly related to
the number of VI recipients in a state, it is affected by state VI policies.
States with stricter VI requirements are likely to have fewer claimants,
and, therefore, will also have lower IVRs, all else being equal. As a
result, when state policy changes serve to increase or decrease the level
of VI recipiency, then the IVR will change, evert in the absence of any
change in labor market conditions. Overall, therefore, the capacity of
the IVR to reflect general economic conditions is neither constant nor
stable.
These problems in using the IVR as a trigger for all states suggest
that equity problems could result from different VI policies in different
states.
Not only would unemployed individuals with similar
characteristics have greater difficulty in becoming eligible for VI
benefits in a state with stricter VI eligibility standards, but even eligible
individuals in that state would be affected by the state laws because the
state is less likely to trigger EB "on." Thus, the use of an IVR trigger
for EB would have the potential to multiply the effects of cross-state
differences in the VI treatment of individuals and extend these
multiplied effects into the EB program, thereby diminishing the
program's countercyclical effectiveness.
With regard to the availability and accuracy of IVR data, the IUR
is reported each week for each state. Although it is not currently
available at the substate level, it is likely that it could be made available
at that level at an increased cost. Because it is derived directly from
unemployment claims information and is collected for administrative
(rather than statistical) purposes, however, it is subject to measurement
error that cannot be quantified. The quality is also likely to vary
substantially across jurisdictions, Because the seasonal adjustment of
a weekly data series is difficult, the IVR is not seasonally adjusted on
a weekly basis at the state level, resulting in higher IVRs during winter
months. As a result, the IVR at the state or substate level is unable to
make a clear distinction between cyclical variation in unemployment
and seasonal variation.
An additional problem is that the IVR only includes current
continuing claimants and, therefore, does not include exhaustees. The
number of VI exhaustees is considered by many to be an important
reflection of labor market distress. An alternative IUR measure that
does include exhaustees has been termed the "Adjusted IUR" (AIUR),
which is defined as the 13-week average IVR plus the exhaustion ratio
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for the most recent three month period. This measure is used in the
current EVC program. It is not currently available at the substate level.

Total Unemployment Rate. The TUR is defined as the number of
individuals without jobs who are actively seeking work divided by the
civilian labor force. Vnlike the IUR, the TUR represents a larger
population than that which is covered under the regular VI program.
The TUR includes new entrants into the labor force, as well as part-time
and contingent workers who are generally ineligible for VI. The TUR
is a more inclusive measure than the IVR and is a measure of the
supply of individuals in the economy looking for work. The TUR,
therefore, is a better measure of the conditions of the economy than the
IVR. For this reason, some believe that the TUR would be better than
the IVR as an EB trigger. Others, however, believe that the trigger
should be closely related to the workers eligible for VI and, therefore,
prefer the IUR.
With regard to data accuracy and availability, the TUR is an
estimate that is derived directly from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) at the state level for the 11 states where CPS sample sizes are
sufficiently large, and from a combination of the CPS, VI, and otller
local data for the 39 other states and for most substate levels. The TUR
is, therefore, subject to a methodological rigor on the state level that is
absent in the administrative data used for the IVR. It should be noted
also that the relationship between the TUR and the condition of the
macroeconomy is not affected by external factors, such as changes in
state VI policies, that can affect the IVR.
At the substate level, however, the TUR is less accurate than at the
state level. Further, it should be noted that the TUR, unlike the IVR,
is currently published on a seasonally adjusted basis for each state.
Consequently, the TUR is capable of making a clearer distinction
between cyclical variation and seasonal variation in unemployment.
The difference between monthly seasonally adjusted and nonseasonally
adjusted TURs in recent years are illustrated in Figure 6-1. The TUR
is available on only a monthly basis. This is not generally considered
a significant problem, however, because moving averages are used with
regard to other measures, such as the 13-week moving average IUR
trigger that is currently in place.
One difficulty with the use of the TUR relates to the redesign of
the CPS that is taking effect in January 1994. Preliminary estimates
suggest that the national TUR may increase by approximately 0.6
percentage points as a result of the implementation of methodological

66

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

FIGURE 6-1
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED AND NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TOTAL
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993
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changes in the survey. The impact upon individual state TURs is
currently unknown, but is expected to vary across states. As a result,
any selection of the TVR as the most appropriate EB trigger mechanism
will require consideration of the relationship between the "new" and
"old" TURs.

Exhaustion Rates. Some have proposed the use of exhaustion
rates on the state or subs tate level. The exhaustion rate is often defined
as the number of individuals who have exhausted regular VI benefits
in a given week, divided by the number of initial VI claims 26 weeks
earlier. Thus, this measure represents a direct measure of job finding
difficulty in a state or area. The exhaustion rate may, therefore,
represent an appropriate trigger to consider for a countercyclical
program. In addition, it allows the condition of long-term unemployed
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individuals to be taken into direct consideration. Because the measure
is lagged by 26 weeks, however, it is possible that it could be late in
reflecting some'significant deteriorations in the labor market.
Further, there are serious problems regarding the accuracy and
availability of exhaustion data. These data are subject to the same
problems with administrative data that mark the IUR. On the substate
level, because of the small numbers of individuals involved, it is likely
that the validity of this measure would be questionable. In addition,
the data are collected by states at the substate level, but often are not
saved. As a result, no quantitative analysis could be completed
regarding the reliability of exhaustion rates at the substate level.

Deviation from Trend Employment.

A final measure of labor
market conditions that might be considered as a potential EB trigger is
the deviation from the existing employment trend. This is defined as
the percentage deviation from the recent employment trend being
experienced by a state or a local area. Such a measure could be an
appropriate trigger for a countercyclical program because, by
measuring the change that is occurring within a state or labor market,
it allows the deterioration of the labor market to be taken into direct
consideration. Employment data, however, are collected and published
first on a preliminary basis with revisions in each of two consecutive
months, with a final benchmarked revision in the spring of each year.
These data also do not cover agricultural workers and would, therefore,
require some form of supplementation for rural states.

Triggering Mechanism Summary. Overall, there are a number of
important points that should be taken into consideration in determining
the triggering mechanism for a countercyclical extended UI benefits
program. First, the TUR measures the total supply of individuals
looking for work and, therefore, is a better measure than the IUR of the
general state of the economy. Second, the IUR covers only those
individuals who are eligible for UI and, therefore, reflects UI eligibility
better than the TUR. Third, the TUR is calculated with methods that
are aimed at providing data that are consistent across all states, while
the IUR reflects rules of eligibility and other factors that differ from one
state to another. Fourth, neither the TUR nor the IUR is as accurate at
the state level as it is at the national level, but more is known about the
quality and reliability of the TUR, which is controlled by statistical
techniques, than about the IUR, which is compiled completely from
administrative data. Finally, the reliability and accuracy of triggering
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mechanisms based upon either exhaustion rates or deviation from trend
employment are not yet clear.
Trigger Levels
Overall, two factors should be considered in determining the level
at which a trigger should be set. First, the desired level of EB
availability should be taken into account. Second, the amount of
funding that would be required for a given level of availability also
should be a factor in making the decision.
With regard to availability, many agree that an effective
countercyclical program would make extended VI benefits available in
response to periods of recession. Because the impact of recession is
often not geographically uniform, it follows that EB should be available
in those states or areas that experience a significant deterioration of
labor market conditions. Most such deteriorations occur in the wake
of national recession or stagnant regional economic growth.
Cost constraints also must be taken into consideration in setting
trigger levels. It may be possible for a certain level of EB recipiency to
be deemed appropriate, but for the necessary funds to be lacking. The
setting of the triggering level, combined with the determination of the
trigger mechanism, is one method for ensuring that scarce resources are
targeted to those individuals in those circumstances that are deemed
most in need of extended VI benefits.
Table 6-1 reports estimates of the costs of an EB program operating
under various triggers between January 1990 and August 1993. The
EVC program, which largely supplanted EB since its inception in
November 1991, has cost a total of over $23 billion as of August 1993.
Thus, it should be noted that the costs of all potential EB triggers
included in the table are significantly lower than the costs of the
emergency program that was actually implemented. This is largely a
result of the improved targeting of benefits that would have resulted.
Thresholds
In an EB program targeted at cyclical unemployment, threshold
requirements (i.e., requirements that the trigger rate in a state or area
must exceed not only a certain level but also exceed by some
percentage the level experienced in that state or area in recent years)
can be used to separate those areas with chronically high
unemployment from those that have experienced a recent cyclical
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TABLE 6-1
ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EB TRIGGERS
(JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993)

Trigger

Estimated Cost
(in billions)

Number of States
Triggering On
at Least Once

Average Total Months
in States Triggering On

Total Unemployment Rate'
6.5% without threshold

$14.0

43

24.4

6.5% with 110% threshold

11.B

43

18.4

6.5% with 120% threshold

9.7

42

14.7

7.5% without threshold

B.5

32

16.5

7.5% with 110% threshold

7.B

32

13.7

7.5% with 120% threshold

6.7

30

11.5

B.5% without threshold

4.2

17

13.7

B.5% with 110% threshold

4.0

17

11.B

B.5% with 120% threshold

3.4

15

10.3

9.5% without threshold

1.1

B

13.3

9.5% with 110% threshold

0.9

B

9.9

9.5% with 120% threshold

0.8

7.4

The cost figures should be considered upper-bound estimates, as they assume a uniform benefit cost of $1,810 far each
exhaustee of regular ill benefits. The estimates assume that an EB program with a given trigger would have operated
in the absence of EUC or any other emergency program. The estimates include the District of Columbia and Puerto

Rico, but exclude the Virgin Islands.
• indicates the current EB trigger.
, Three-month moving average of the nonseasonally adjusted state ruN.
, Thirteen-week moving average of the state IUR. [Calculations in this table were made on a monthiy basis, using
monthly averages of weekly moving averages.1
Source: Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation staff calculations using data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment insurance Service.
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TABLE 6-1 (Continued)
ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EB TRIGGERS
(JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993)

Trigger

Estimated Cost
(in billions)

Nwnber of States
Triggering On
at Least Once

Average Total Months
in States Triggering On

Insured Unemployment Rate 2
1.5% without threshold

$20.8

51

39.7

1.5 X, with 110% threshold

12.9

51

21.3

1.5% with 120% threshold

9.9

48

15.7

11.6

37

21.5

3% with 110% threshold

8.0

37

13.6

3% with 120% threshold

6.3

34

10.9

4% without threshold

5.0

21

15.7

4% with 110% threshold

3.9

21

10.8

4% with 120% threshold

3.2

19

8.8

5% without threshold

1.3

11

11.6

5 Yc, with HOIX, threshold

1.1

11

8.4

SIX, with 120% threshold""

0.9

10

6.2

1

3°,.{, without threshold

1

Emergency Unemployment Compensation
$23.0

52

22.0

deterioration of the labor market. Thresholds under the EB program
historically have been set at 120 percent for IUR triggers and at 110
percent for TUR triggers. Without the use of thresholds, there is no
way of distinguishing cyclical unemployment from chronically high
unemployment. As a result, it is possible that the countercyclical
effectiveness of the program would be eroded in the absence of
thresholds, as more states or areas triggered EB "on" during periods
when there is no actual deterioration in labor market conditions.
As seen in Table 6-1, the threshold requirements do not appear to
affect significantly the number of states in which EB eventually triggers
"on" with a given trigger level. Within states with particularly high
unemployment, however, the analysis suggests that thresholds often
have the effect of delaying the point at which EB triggers "on" or
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hastening the point at which EB triggers "off." Figures 6-2 and 6-3
compare the effects of a 6.5 percent TUR trigger with 110 percent
threshold and 6.5 percent TUR trigger without threshold. With regard
to the percentage of total exhaustees who are eligible to receive EB
benefits, thresholds have little effect during the highest periods of
national unemployment, but reduce the percentage of eligible
individuals both before and after the peak of the recession. It also
should be noted that EUC did not become available until November
1991, months after an EB program with either 6.5 percent trigger would
have been available to a large percentage of exhaustees.
As with trigger levels, cost considerations play a direct role in
determining whether a threshold should be used and, if so, what the
level of that threshold should be. Overall, the use of thresholds in an
EB trigger would have the effect of reducing potential EB expenditures,
all else being equal.

Geographic Unit of Analysis
There are a number of different geographical units that can be
used as the basis of the triggering measure chosen for EB: (1) national,
(2) regional, (3) state, and (4) substate. Each of these is discussed in
greater detail below.

National Triggers. From 1970 to 1981, in addition to the state
triggers, a national EB trigger was in place. The existence of a national
trigger is perhaps particularly appropriate in a countercyclical EB
program that is designed to pay benefits during periods of recession,
because the very concept of recession is one that continues to be
essentially national in scope. Indeed, although there has not been a
national EB trigger in operation since 1981, the current EUC program
represents, in effect, a program that pays extended ur benefits on a
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FIGURE 6-2
NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TUR AND ESTIMATED PERCENT OF
MONTHLY UI EXHAUSTEES ELIGIBLE FOR EB UNDER 6.5% TRIGGER,
NO THRESHOLD, JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993
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national level. While EVe has provided for some differentiation across
states with regard to the potential duration of benefits (because
economic conditions within each state partially determine the maximum
potential duration of Eve benefits in that state), the program still has
made some form of extended benefits available to individuals in all
states during the most recent recession and its aftermath.
There also exist a number of arguments against national triggers.
Because recent recessions have been regional in impact (the most recent
one was concentrated in the Northeast and in the West), paying
benefits to individuals who reside in states that are relatively unaffected
by a "national" recession is likely to result in the payment of scarce
extended benefit funds to some individuals who do not face severe
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FIGURE 6-3
NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TUR AND ESTIMATED PERCENT OF
MONTHLY VI EXHAUSTEES ELIGIBLE FOR EB UNDER 6.5% TRIGGER, 110%
. THRESHOLD, JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993
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labor market conditions. Targeting EB benefits on the state or substate
level alone is likely to direct benefits more efficiently to those
individuals who are most affected by poor or deteriorating labor
market conditions.

Regional Triggers. Some have suggested the creation of regional
triggers for the EB program. Under such a system, the country would
be divided into a number of geographic regions, within which EB
triggers could operate to activate the program for the entire region.
The use of regional triggers may represent an appropriate response to
the apparent increase in the regionalization of recessions.
It is likely, however, that the use of regional triggers would result
in a poor targeting of benefits. Because it is possible for economic
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conditions to vary across states within the same region, it would be
expected that the use of a regional trigger would result, at times, either
in the payment of extended ur benefits in states that are not
experiencing serious labor market difficulties or in the absence of
benefits in a state that is experiencing such difficulties. Further, there
is the problem of defining the boundaries of the regions to be used.

State Triggers. Currently, all EB triggers operate at the state level.
This allows greater differentiation in the targeting of benefits than
would exist under a national or regional trigger, but it does not allow
direct targeting at the level of specific labor markets. With regard to
data issues, many relevant data sets are focused already at the state
level, allowing greater flexibility in determining triggers, as well as
greater confidence in the accuracy of the data that are used.
Substate Triggers. Some have suggested that triggering benefits at
the substate level would allow for a more effective targeting of benefits
toward those individuals who are experiencing significant difficulties
in finding a new job in their labor market.
Although the idea of targeting benefits based upon local area
economic conditions is a conceptually attractive one, a number of
administrative, logistical, and statistical problems combine to make the
use of substate triggers quite problematic. Among the administrative
issues often cited by opponents of substate triggers are difficulties in
determining the appropriate level of geographic disaggregation and the
proper locational assignment of individuals (i.e., by residence or by
place of work). These issues also create equity concerns, as the
possibility increases that similar individuals within geographic
proximity will receive different treatment under the EB program.
A number of recurring statistical problems also occur that are
difficult or impossible to resolve. Data for some measures are simply
not available on the substate level or the data are not saved by the
states, rendering statistical analysis of this data impossible. Even for
those data that are available (i.e., substate TUR estimates and estimates
ofemployment levels in metropolitan areas), there are a number of
obstacles. There is no way of determining the accuracy of substate
TUR estimates~ bf2cause there is no other available periodic data source
that would enable the data to be benchmarked. Officials of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics voiced skepticism over the reliability of these data as
an EB trigger.
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Estimates of employment, on the other hand, can be validated, but
are only available for 250 metropolitan areas in the country. In order
for a trigger to be politically feasible, it would require that all regions
have the possibility of triggering "on." To ensure this possibility with
the use of employment statistics, so-called "balance of state"
measurements would need to be created, and such statistics are
typically marked by significant accuracy problems.

Geographic Units of Analysis Summary. There are a number of
important points that should be taken into consideration in determining
the geographic unit of analysis for a countercyclical extended UI
benefits program. First, the ability to target benefits generally increases
as smaller geographic units are used as the basis for determining
benefits, but the reliability of the data decreases as smaller units are
used. Second, data at the substate level present particular problems
with regard to reliability and, for some measures, availability.

Requirements Imposed Upon EB Recipients
Currently, the requirements that EB recipients search for work and
accept so-called suitable work have been suspended by the Congress.
The suitable work provision requires that those individuals who are
receiving EB must, with some exceptions, accept a minimum wage job
if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. In most cases, this
requirement is stricter than the state standards that govern the work
search activities of regular state UI recipients. Many have advocated
the elimination of this federal provision. Currently, it has been
suspended until 1995.
With regard to work search generally, there is little evidence that
directly addresses the impact of work search during periods of
economic downturn, when jobs are relatively scarce. The existing
research tends to analyze one of two related categories: (1) the effect
of work search requirements upon individual search efforts and (2) the
effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits upon the
duration of unemployment. The results of this research are discussed
below.
A study of the effects of varying work search rules and
enforcement across states found that claimants from states where work
search rules are strict are more likely to search for work, devote more
hours to work search, and make contact with more potential employers
than claimants in other states. 9
An experiment in Tacoma,
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Wasrungton, found that stricter work search requirements reduced
unemployment spells for VI recipients, although the impact upon
employment and earnings was less clear.lO Thus, there does appear
to be evidence that the nature of work search requirements has an
impact upon the behavior of VI claimants.
In addition, there is evidence that individuals' rates of
reemployment are much higher in the weeks just after exhaustion of VI
benefits than just before. For example, existing research suggests that
during periods of economic expansion, 25 percent to 40 percent of
workers who exhaust their VI benefits find reemployment within four
weeks of benefit exhaustion,u This is far higher than the rate at which
jobless workers become reemployed in the four weeks before
exhaustion of benefits; only about ten percent of workers drawing
benefits four weeks before their benefits are scheduled to end become
reemployed before they exhaust their benefits.
Further, three reemployment bonus experiments have suggested
that when VI recipients are offered a cash bonus to become rapidly
reemployed, they do become reemployed more quickly. There is no .
evidence that individuals accepted lower-paying jobs as a result of the
bonus offer.12 Thus, existing research suggests that unemployed
workers' job search behavior can be changed by job search
requirements and monetary incentives.
Finally, there is evidence that increases in the potential duration of
VI tend to lengthen the duration of time out of work. A number of
researchers have estimated the impact of adding a week to the potential
duration of benefits on the duration of both unemployment (time out
of work spent searching for work) and joblessness (time out of work
spent either searching for work or out of the labor force). While there
appears to be agreement that longer benefit durations have an effect,
the existing research has produced a range of estimates. Researchers
have estimated that adding a week to the potential duration of benefits
adds from one-tenth to over four-tenths of a week to the duration of
unemploymentP It also has been estimated that adding a week to the
potential duration of benefits adds from four-tenths to over sixth-tenths
of a week to the duration of joblessness. 14
Financing
There are two significant policy decisions related to EB financing:
(1) whether there should be experience rating in the EB program and
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(2) the proportion of the benefits paid by the federal and state
governments. Each of these is discussed in more detail below.

Experience Rating in EB
An additional policy option that could be considered is mandating
either that all states use experience rating in the EB program or that no
states use experience rating. Currently, 34 states experience rate
benefits under EB, meaning that some percentage of EB benefits paid
are ultimately charged back to the employer. IS In large part, the
experience rating of the EB program is consistent with one of the
perspectives that distinguishes the UI program as a whole: employers
should bear some degree of responsibility for their former employees
who are UI claimants. It is unclear, however, that increases in EB
experience rating would have any significant effect upon employer
behavior, because EB costs represent such a small percentage of overall
UI taxes.
There are a number of arguments that can be made against the
experience rating of EB. While an individual employer may be deemed
partially responsible for the initial consequences arising from the layoff
of an employee, an individual's eligibility for countercyclical extended
benefits may be viewed as an indication that the unemployment spell
is no longer the responsibility of the previous employer. Under such
a perspective, extended benefits should be paid by society as a whole
and there may be little justification for continuing to charge EB
payments back to the previous employer.
Further, because the experience rating of an employer already
increases following a layoff, some may consider additional increases to
be an undue burden. EB experience rating is felt only by those
employers in states that have triggered EB "on," who are among the
most likely employers to be facing severe economic problems. Thus,
experience rating EB would disproportionately affect those employers
who are least able to pay the costs.

Federal-State Shares of EB
Currently, the costs of EB benefits are shared equally by the federal
and state governments. The EUC program, however, is fully federally
funded. As a result, states have chosen to make EUC available to longterm eligible unemployed, and the 50 percent state-funded EB program
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has been little-used in the most recent recession. Proposals have been
advanced to change the funding mix in EB, with such changes tied to
the adoption of a new EB trigger. Most such proposals have centered
upon shifting 75 percent of the costs to the federal government, since
EB eligibility (and therefore state costs) would be expected to increase
dramatically under most new triggers.

Determining Duration of Benefits
In determining the maximum potential duration of benefits,
there are three primary options: (1) the maximum duration can be
fixed, (2) the duration can be determined by economic conditions
within the state or area, or (3) the duration can be determined by the
efforts of the individual. Both of these options are discussed in greater
detail below.

Fixed Duration
The maximum potential duration of benefits can be fixed, as it is
under the current EB program, which extends benefits for up to
13 additional weeks.

Duration Determined by Economic Conditions
The maximum potential duration of benefits can be determined by
economic conditions, under a provision that would be similar to the
current Eue program, in which benefits are available to be paid for a
longer period of time in states with particularly high unemployment
rates. Such a determination may be most appropriate under a national
trigger, in which economic conditions across eligible states would,
perhaps, be the most varied. Under the current EB program, all states
that trigger "on" have slack labor markets, and differentiating among
them may not be productive.

Duration Determined by Individual Actions
It is also possible to determine maximum potential duration
according to individual participation in job search activities and/or
education and training programs. Because such programs may increase
the likelihood of eventual reemployment, increased potential durations
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may be justified for those individuals who participate in such
programs.

EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A PROGRAM TARGETED TO
DISLOCATED WORKERS
An alternative orientation of an extended UI benefit program
would target benefits at dislocated workers. Although some worker
dislocation is part of the normal working of the labor market because
it serves to direct human resources to those areas where they are most
valuable, the individuals who are dislocated often suffer greatly. As
discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence that workers who are
dislocated from their jobs experience long spells of unemployment and
that many suffer significant losses in earnings. As a result, programs
designed to provide additional income maintenance to such individuals
may be justified. There are a number of different ways in which such
efforts could be folded into an extended VI benefits program.
There are three significant policy decisions that must be made' to
determine the shape of a dislocated worker EB program. The most
fundamental issue to be resolved is the identification of those workers
who are designated "dislocated" and are, therefore, eligible to receive
dislocated worker extended VI benefits. Second, the method governing
the duration of eligibility for EB also must be determined. Third, a
decision must be made regarding the method of financing the program.

Determining Eligibility
There are two primary methods for determining eligibility for
dislocated worker extended benefits. These potential methods are as
follows: (1) a determination of dislocated worker status by the
individual him/herself, as manifested by a willingness to participate in
some public program targeted at dislocated workers; or (2) an external
determination of the characteristics that identify dislocated workers,
combined with participation in some dislocated worker program. Each
of these options is discussed below.

Requiring Participation in Dislocated Worker Program
It would be possible to pay extended benefits to those individuals
who choose to participate in programs targeted at dislocated workers.
Research evidence suggests that job search assistance and job search
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clubs are particularly effective in assisting individuals in a timely return
to work, 16 It is possible that those individuals who perceive a
potential benefit from programs such as job training, job search
assistance, or job search clubs are the most likely actually to have been
dislocated from their jobs. The participation requirement would help
to screen out those who do not believe that they would benefit from
participation. Conversely, however, such a requirement would
encourage individuals to participate solely in order to be eligible for
benefitsP
One possible way to help ensure that only those
individuals participate who would benefit would be to require that
participants agree to repay some percentage of the training costs after
becoming reemployed. Such payment could be structured in such a
way that it would be spread over a lengthy time period, in order to
ensure that it not represent an undue burden for participants.

Designating Workers as "Dislocated"
It is possible to determine eligibility for the program based
partially upon some set of "dislocated worker" characteristics. For
example, some simple screens for eligibility (e.g., a certain period of job
tenure in previous job combined with no recall status with previous
employer) could be used together with participation in a dislocated
worker program, as described above. Such participation would help to
ensure that those who are self-identified as most in need of assistance
receive extended benefits, but would impose some limitations upon the
characteristics of those individuals who are given the option of
determining whether or not to participate in such a program.

Financing
A determination must be made regarding the share of program
costs that should be borne by the federal and state governments. As
noted above, the costs of the current EB program are shared equally
between the federal and state governments.
It should be recognized that it is quite possible that the costs of
such a program would increase over spending levels on EB in the past.
While the program would represent, to some extent, a consolidation of
VI with existing training programs, other elements of it would likely
represent an expansion of those concepts. In particular, it would be
expected that demand for education and training programs would
increase if participation were a requirement for the receipt of extended
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VI benefits. As noted above, some percentage of this cost could be
defrayed by requiring recipients to agree to repay in the future some
percentage of their training costs. If overall costs still represent an
increase over historic levels, it would be necessary to identify some
appropriate funding mechanism.

Determining Duration of Benefits
For options, see the subsection of the same name in the section
discussing countercyclical EB options.

EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A PROGRAM AVAILABLE
BOTH TO CYCLICALLY AND STRUCTURALLY
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS
An additional alternative is to target both the cyclically and
structurally unemployed populations for extended VI benefits. One
logical means for accomplishing this end would be to combine the
elements of both the countercyclically focused concept of the program
and the dislocation-targeted program in a two-pronged program. Such
a program could allow extended benefits to be paid during periods of
high cyclical unemployment, as identified by a trigger at some
geographic level of analysis. In addition, such a program could allow
benefits to be paid to workers who are in some way identified as
dislocated.
The specific programmatic features of each of the two segments of
the program generally could be determined independently, based upon
the options presented in the above sections. Indeed, many of the policy
decisions apply only to one of the two segments. Triggering
mechanisms and levels apply only in the countercyclical portion of the
program. The definition of a dislocated worker applies only in the
structural segment. Other policy issues, such as the financing of
benefits, the potential duration of benefits, and the requirements
imposed upon recipients, could be applied either uniformly or
differently under the two segments, depending upon the desired
features of the program.
One additional decision that would need to be made concerns the
relationship between the two segments of the program. The dislocated
worker segment could be in effect at all times in all areas, even in the
absence of high cyclical unemployment. Alternatively, the dislocated
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worker segment could be available only as a supplement for EB
exhaustees in states or areas that have triggered EB "on."

Chapter 7

State Trust Fund
Solvency

T

HE LEVEL of trust fund reserves available to pay UI
benefits declined significantly in the 1970s and early
1980s due to high and prolonged unemployment. As a result, the
federal government enacted legislation to encourage state solvency.
The federal government has taken the following actions: (1) raised
the federal taxable wage base, (2) raised the federal tax rate, and
(3) changed the loan and repayment provisions for those states
that borrow from the federal loan fund in order to pay UI benefits. The
states, in response to federal legislation and to their trust fund
solvency problems, also enacted legislation. Many of the states
passed legislation that focused upon one or more of the
following: (1) increasing the state taxable wage base, (2) increasing
employers' tax rates, (3) implementing solvency surtaxes that trigger on
when a state experiences solvency problems, (4) tightening eligibility
requirements, and (5) decreasing the maximum potential duration of
benefits. The impact of this federal and state legislation has been a
significant decline in the proportion of the unemployed who receive UI
benefits.
A number of policy options are available to provide additional
encouragement for states to improve their trust fund solvency. Among
the broad categories of policy changes that have been proposed are the
following: (1) changes in the existing taxable wage base, (2) changes in
the existing tax rates, and (3) new initiatives to encourage state
solvency.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FINANCING
The UI program is funded through a combination of federal and
state UI payroll taxes on employers based on separate taxable wage
bases and tax rates. These various taxes are discussed below.
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Federal Tax
Currently, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) gross tax
is 6.2 percent on the first $7,000 of an employee's salary. Since the UI
system's inception, the federal government has generally given the
states the freedom to determine their own policies regarding UI
taxation and benefits. The federal government, however, offers a 5.4
percent credit on the 6.2 percent FUTA tax to employers in those states
with federally approved UI plans and no outstanding federal loans for
the program. The potential net tax rate of 0.8 percent ($56 per worker)
provides states with a strong incentive to comply with federal
requirements, since in the absence of compliance, the 6.2 percent tax
would cost employers $434 per worker. 1
Revenue from the federal tax is allocated to three federal UI funds:
the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), which
finances both state and federal administrative costSj the Extended
Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), which pays 50 percent
of EB payments; and the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA), which
provides loans to states experiencing insolvencies in their accounts. 2
Figure 7-1 illustrates the flow and allocation of FUTA funds received.
Figures 7-2 and 7-3 illustrate the historical levels of FUTA tax
collections and the net balances of the associated federal UI trust funds.

State Tax
Each state is responsible for providing regular UI benefits for its
own residents. To finance these payments, states levy payroll taxes on
covered employers, as does the federal government through the FUTA
tax. Taxes collected per worker vary significantly across states, ranging
in 1992 from $42 in South Dakota to $493 in Alaska (see Table 7-1).
Because of the financial incentive outlined above, all states comply with
the $7,000 federal wage base requirement; 40 states have established
state taxable wage bases higher than the federal level. During
recessionary periods, because increases in the number of claimants tend
to drain trust funds, states often shift the entire schedule of tax rates
upward, charging more of all employers to replenish their UI trust fund
balances. Conversely, during periods of low unemployment, states
tend to shift their tax schedules downward. States are required to
deposit all employer tax revenues with the Federal Treasury, which
credits individual state accounts. As needed, funds are disbursed to
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FIGURE 7-1
FLOW OF FUTA FUNDS UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTES
0.8% Employer Tax"

i

Monthly Transfers of All Net Collections

!
(1) EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT (ESAA) for
flnanclng admlnlslratlve costs of the employment secuMIY program. Monthly
0.72% of the 0.8% employer tax is to be retained in the ESAA account while
0.08% is to be lransferred to (2). Up to 95% after transfers to (2) may be
appropriated to finance state administrative costs; balance available to
meet federal administrative costs.
Statutory limit retained in this account at the beginning of a fiscal year is
40% of appropriation for the prior fiscal year.

I

Effective January,
1991 monthly
transfers=20% of
net collections
unless above

Excess if (2)
Is over statutory
limit of September 30
of any year

I

Excess if (1)
is over statutory
limit on October 1
of any year and
(2) is not over

t

Excess if (3)
Is ovar statutory
limit on
September 30 of
any year

l'-_______

r-st_a_tu_to"'rry_lim_i_t_ _ _ _ _-L-_ _ _ _---'lL..ts....,statutory,.lim_i_t_ _ _ _

(2) EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION ACCOUNT (EUCA)

I

Excess if (1) & (2)
ara over statutory
limit and (3) is
not, on October 1
of any year
.L...l_ _- ,

(3) FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT
ACCOUNT (FUA) for repayable adVances

for financing federal-state EB & EUC
programs

to states with depleted reserves

Statutory limit: 0.5% of totel wages in
covered employment in preceding
calendar year

Statutory limit: 0.25% of total wages in
covered employment In preceding
calendar year

If (1) (2) & (3) are over statutory limit on October 1 of
any year, excess funds are distributed to state trust fund
accounts If there are no outstanding advances from
General Revenue to either FUA or EUCA .

• Effective tax, after 5.4% is offset against 6.2% federal unemployment tax. Current law value will
drop to 0.6% on January 1, 1997.
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FIGURE 7-2
FUTA TAX COLLECTIONS IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS,
FISCAL YEARS 1954-1992

$7~-----------------------------'$7

$6

$5
~

~

~ $4

$4

'"
E$3

$3

o

ri

Q
H

~ $2

.............................................................. $2

o

'M

+J

~ $1
....

$1

o

()

$0

54

58

62

66

70

74

78

82

Fiscal Year
Source:

USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services.

86

90

$0

STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY

87

FIGURE 7-3
NET BALANCE IN FEDERAL TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS IN CONSTANT 1992
DOLLARS, 1970-1992
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TABLE 7-1
PER WORKER STATE TAXES COLLECTED, BY STATE IN 1992

Alaska
Rhode Island
New Jersey
Massachusetts
Michigan
Washington
Pennsylvania
Oregon
District of Columbia
Maryland
New York
West Virginia
Virgin Islands
Ohio
Maine
Illinois
Wyoming
Connecticut
California
Vermont
Wisconsin
Puerto Rico
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky

$493
$436
$384
$382
$374
$325
$316
$295
$268
$250
$245
$243
$240
$228
$227
$223
$216
$210
$208
$204
$195
$185
$185
$181
$179
$177
$173

Minnesota
Louisiana
Iowa
New Mexico
Montana
New Hampshire
Missouri
North Dakota
Colorado
South Carolina
Nevada
Mississippi
Georgia
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Florida
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Hawaii
Alabama
Indiana
Nebraska
Arizona
Virginia
South Dakota

$173
$166
$164
$158
$152
$144
$142
$141
$137
$132
$132
$130
$127
$125
$124
$120
$107
$105
$102
$101
$98
$93
$92
$87
$78
$42

Source: USDOL \ ETA \UIS\Division of Actuarial Services.

states for VI benefits payments. Federal loans are available from the
FVA to cover revenue shortfalls.

Experience Rating
The VI payroll tax is "experience rated," meaning that the tax paid
by employers is determined, at least in part, by either the actual or
potential benefits that are collected by former employees. Experience
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rating is intended to discourage layoffs, provide for an equitable
allocation of the costs of VI benefit payments across employers, and
give employers an incentive to challenge unjustified benefit claims. In
an experience rated system, employers who frequently layoff
employees are taxed at a higher rate than those who infrequently lay
off employees. As a result, experience rating causes employer tax rates
to vary greatly across industries, with those industries with the fewest
layoffs also paying the lowest average VI taxes (see Figure 7-4).
Some VI benefit payments, however, do fall outside the scope of
experience rating. Cases in which benefit outlays cannot be or are not
assigned as the responsibility of an active employer are categorized as
one of the following: (1) noncharged benefits, which occur when
benefits originate from an employer who did not cause the job
termination; (2) benefits charged to inactive employers, which occur
when former employees continue to collect benefits although an
employer has become inactive; or (3) ineffectively charged benefits,
which occur when the revenues that an employer has paid into the
system do not cover the benefit charges originating with that employer.
Ineffectively charged benefits are, in large part, the result of maximum
tax rates within most of the states' systems. Thus, those employers
who are at the maximum tax rate (because of layoffs) generate costs to
the VI system that must be partially funded by other employers.
The term "perfect" experience rating describes a system in which
each extra dollar of benefits payments causes an employer to be
charged an additional dollar in taxes. Because noncharges, charges to
inactive employers, and ineffective charges diminish the effect of the
experience rating system, experience rating is termed "imperfect."
The Experience Rating Index (ERI) provides a measure of the
degree of experience rating in a state. The ERI is a proportion
calculated by (1) totaling all noncharges, ineffective charges, and
charges to inactive employers; (2) subtracting this sum from total
benefit payments; and then (3) dividing this difference by total benefit
payments and multiplying by 100. An ERI of 60, therefore, indicates
that these three types of charges represent 40 percent of total benefit
payments. In the period between 1988 and 1992, the average state ERI
was 63. In 1992, ERIs ranged from a minimum of 31 in Oklahoma to
a maximum of 83 in Louisiana. 3 Table 7-2 illustrates cross-state
differences in ERIs.
Four problematic consequences are commonly attributed to
experience rating. The first is interindustry cross-subsidization, which
results from imperfect experience rating. VI payroll taxes generally
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FIGURE 7-4
ill TAXES PAID AS PERCENT OF TAXABLE WAGES, BY MAJOR
PRIVATE INDUSTRY, 1991
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TABLE 7-2
EXPERIENCE RATING INDEX, BY STATE IN 1992

Louisiana
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Tennessee
Arizona
Utah
Ohio
Maryland
Wisconsin
Colorado
Wyoming
New Jersey
Michigan
New Mexico
District of Columbia
North Dakota
Minnesota
Kentucky
Arkansas
Nebraska
Kansas
Washington
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Missouri

83
79
78
74
71
69
68
65
65
65
64
63
63
63
62
62
60
58
58
58
57
57
57
56
56
55
55

Montana
New Hampshire
South Carolina
Vermont
Florida
California
Georgia
Virginia
Mississippi
Texas
New York
Oregon
Alabama
South Dakota
Idaho
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Maine
Nevada
North Carolina
Hawaii
Oklahoma
Alaska
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Delaware

55
55
54
54
53
52
52
51
51
51
51
51
49
49
44
43
42
41
41
37
32
31
a
b
N/A
N/A

(a) index cannot be computed due to type of experience rating system.
(b) all employers taxed at uniform rates in these years.
N/ A indicates data are not available.
Source: Vroman, 1993.

exceed benefit charges in those industries with traditionally low
unemployment, resulting in employers in those industries subsidizing
traditionally high unemployment industries, in which benefit charges
usually exceed taxes. In order to counter the effects of industrial crosssubsidization, some have suggested that employers be fully experience
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rated or, alternatively, that the system should be redesigned to prohibit
interindustry cross-subsidization, but to allow cross subsidies to exist
within particular industries. 4
A second concern, which also results from imperfect experience
rating, is that experience rating does not prevent layoffs when
employers are taxed at the maximum rate. Because additional layoffs
do not cause an increase in the employers' VI taxes in this situation,
imperfect experience rating may result in higher unemployment. In
order to reduce this effect, some have suggested increasing the
maximum experience rating tax. An additional concern that has been
expressed about experience rating is that it imposes high taxes on
declining industries. These taxes may, in tum, contribute to further
declines in employment.
Finally, experience rating has been faulted for creating an overly
adversarial relationship between employers and claimants. Experience
rating gives employers a financial incentive (reduced taxes) to contest
former employees' VI claims. While this incentive encourages sel£policing, the level of contentiousness in the system exceeds that found
in other industrialized nations. Indeed, about 30 percent of the
administrative costs associated with paying VI benefits are the result
of administrative processes that decide appeals and nonmonetary
issues. s

REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
This section describes the linkages between economic conditions,
state trust fund solvency problems, changes in federal and state
legislation, and declines in VI recipiency. It examines trends in trust
fund reserves and VI recipiency within the context of recent economic
conditions; discusses the options available to states when they are faced
with solvency problems; and points to potential conflicts between
states' objectives and federal goals for the VI program.

Decline in Trust Fund Reserve Adequacy
A number of different measures indicate that the adequacy of state
trust funds has declined over time. This evidence is discussed below.
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Trust Fund Balances
Since the inception of the regular VI program in 1939 until the
1960s, the program operated on a forward-funded, or pre-funding basis.
States set their tax rates and benefit levels to accumulate adequate trust
fund reserves during times of economic expansion, which allowed them
to pay VI benefits from their reserves in periods of economic downturn.
Unusually high and prolonged unemployment during the 1970s
drained many states' trust fund reserves. As a result, many states had
to rely for the first time on automatic federal loans in order to make VI
payments (see Figure 7-5).
In 1972, only two states needed loans from the federal government,
totaling $100 million. By the end of 1979, however, 25 states had
borrowed more than $5.6 billion, with $3.8 billion still owed by 13
states. 6 The peak in state debt occurred in 1983 at $13.4 billion.
Benefit payments in 1982 and 1983 exceeded tax receipts by $9.5 billion
in 1982 and $4.1 billion in 1983.
This situation began to reverse itself between 1984 and 1989, as the
economy improved. As a result, fewer states required loans. After
1989, the situation once again deteriorated; in 1990, 1991, and 1992,
outlays surpassed VI tax revenues by $3 billion, $10 billion, and $8
billion, respectively.7 Recent state borrowing, however, has been at
fairly low levels; only four states had loans outstanding at the end of
1992 for a total of $1.1 billion.

High Cost Multiple
The high cost multiple (HCM), which measures how long
recession-level benefits could be paid from a state's current trust fund
balance, is the most common measure used to indicate a trust fund's
solvency (or adequacy).8 The HCM is calculated by comparing two
ratios: (1) the ratio of current net trust fund reserves to current year
total wages earned in insured employment divided by (2) the ratio of
the largest amount of total state benefit payments experienced in any
12 consecutive months to the total wages in insured employment
during those 12 months. Historically, the Interstate Commission of
Employment Security Administrators has endorsed a high cost multiple
of 1.5. Others, however, have advocated a standard of 1.0 as
adequate. 9 Figure 7-6 illustrates how the HCM for the overall VI
system has changed over time. Between 1954 and 1969, the average
HCM was 2.1. It declined steadily during the 1970s and was actually
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FIGURE 7-5
AMOUNT OF FEDERAL LOANS AND NUMBER OF
STATES WITH OUTSTANDING LOANS, 1972-1992
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FIGURE 7-6
HIGH COST MULTIPLE FOR THE OVERALL
UI SYSTEM, 1954-1992
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negative in 1982 and 1983. The HeM rebounded somewhat in 1989
and 1990, but has been in decline since the most recent recession. The
number of states maintaining adequate reserves, as measured by an
HeM of 1.5 has declined between 1972 and 1983 and remained fairly
low thereafter. Using a less conservative HeM standard of 1.0 provides
a somewhat more positive picture of state solvency. Table 7-3
illustrates 1992 state HeMs and Figure 7-7 illustrates the number of
states with adequate HeMs over time.
Nevertheless, many
policymakers fear that states' trust funds are currently unprepared for
a serious recession. This view is supported in simulation models
performed by the GAO and by Vroman.lO
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TABLE 7-3
HIGH COST MULTIPLE, BY STATE IN 1992

Virgin Islands
Puerto Rico
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Oregon
Kansas
Utah
Vermont
Hawaii
South Dakota
Mississippi
Wyoming
Iowa
Idaho
Wisconsin
Delaware
Indiana
Alaska
Washington
North Carolina
Nebraska
Alabama
Colorado
New Jersey
Florida
Georgia
Virginia

3.21
2.15
1.69
1.53
1.47
1,47
1,40
1.37
1.35
1.29
1.26
1.23
1.21
1.16
1.13
1.13
1.11
1.06
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.90
0.87
0.85
0.80
0.79
0.74

Louisiana
Tennessee
North Dakota
Nevada
Montana
South Carolina
New Hampshire
Arizona
Kentucky
California
Texas
West Virginia
Rhode Island
Illinois
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Arkansas
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
New York
Missouri
Massachusetts
Connecticut
District of Columbia

Source: USDOLjETA/UISjDivision of Actuarial Services.

0.72
0.69
0.65
0.65
0.62
0.60
0.55
0.55
0.54
0,42
0.36
0.35
0.32
0.28
0.27
0.25
0.21
0.20
0.17
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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FIGURE 7-7
STATES WITH ADEQUATE RESERVES AS MEASURED BY HIGH COST
MULTIPLE,1954-1992
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Reserve Ratio
The reserve ratio is another measure of trust fund solvency.
Beginning with the steady increases in employment and inflation in the
1950s and 1960s, the reserve ratio (net reserves as a share of total
covered wages) has declined. From a maximum of lOA percent of
covered wages in 1945, the reserve ratio declined to 6.8, 3.3, and 3.1
percent in 1950, 1960, and 1970, respectively. Continuing its decline,
the reserve ratio dipped below zero in 1982 and 1983; by 1990,
however, it had risen to 1.9 percent of covered wages. Despite this
recovery, many analysts consider the current reserve to be unacceptably
low.
Figure 7-8 illustrates that, with the exception of some minor
upturns during periods of growth, the reserve ratio fell between 1945
and 1983. The reversal of this long-term trend in 1983 appears to be
attributable, at least in part, to the growing number of states that raised
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their taxable wage base above the federal level. Table 7-4 illustrates the
variability of reserve ratios across states in 1992.
FIGURE 7-8
RESERVE RATIO AND FUTA WAGE BASE, 1938-1992
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TABLE 7-4
RESERVE RATIO, BY STATE IN 1992

Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Oregon
Alaska
Vermont
Washington
Wyoming
Idaho
Hawaii
Iowa
Delaware
Wisconsin
Kansas
Utah
New Jersey
New Mexico
Mississippi
North Carolina
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Indiana
Alabama
Montana
Nevada
South Carolina
Georgia
North Dakota

9.05
7.33
4.71
4.57
4.45
4.18
3.71
3.67
3.57
3.16
3.04
2.90
2.89
2.83
2.83
2.77
2.48
2.25
2.22
2.10
1.99
1.96
1.87
1.79
1.73
1.68
1.51

Tennessee
Kentucky
Florida
Nebraska
Rhode Island
West Virginia
New Hampshire
Arizona
South Dakota
Colorado
California
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Ohio
Arkansas
Minnesota
Maine
Texas
Maryland
Michigan
New York
Missouri
Massachusetts
Connecticut
District of Columbia

Source: USDOLjETAjUISjDivision of Actuarial Services.

1.50
1.49
1.47
1.46
1.41
1.38
1.38
1.36
1.34
1.10
0.98
0.96
0.84
0.74
0.66
0.55
0.54
0.44
0.41
0.37
0.17
0.12
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Decline in Unemployment Insurance Recipiency
Chapter 4 reviews the decline in the percentage of unemployed
workers who receive regular VI benefits, a decline that was especially
pronounced during the early 1980s. Researchers have focused on the
relationship between state trust fund solvency (as expressed by the
HCM) and VI recipiency. A state's HCM could be low in a given year
for a number of reasons, including the level of the HCM in previous
years, small tax collections, and large benefit outlays. A recent GAO
report indicates the decline in recipiency is often the direct consequence
of state legislation designed to improve their solvency status. Table 7-5
illustrates changes in recipiency during the recessionary period of 1980
to 1985, based on the level of a state's HCM in 1980. Those states with
lower HCMs in 1980 experienced larger declines in recipiency in the
years between 1980 and 1985 than those states with higher than average
HCMs in 1980Y The correlation between the decline in trust fund
adequacy and the decline in VI recipiency can be seen in Figure 7-9.
This decline in recipiency is important. When the number of
recipients declines, the VI program loses its effectiveness as a
countercyclical stimulus tool and as a temporary wage replacement for
the unemployed. A 1990 GAO report estimates that if recipiency rates
were similar to those in the mid-1970s (before states began experiencing
solvency problems), then an additional $20 billion in VI benefits would
have been available to the economy during the most recent recession. 12

Tradeoff Among Borrowing, Taxation, and Benefit Levels
A variety of alternative legislative responses are available to states
that face solvency problems. One option is to take out loans from the
federal government. Another option is to increase reserves by raising
or restructuring employers' VI tax rates. 13 The third option is to limit
the benefits either by restricting the number of individuals eligible for
VI, or by decreasing the payments that VI claimants receive. Each of
these options is discussed below.

Borrowing
In order for states to ensure they are always solvent and never
need to borrow from the federal government (Le., no risk of
insolvency), states would require either very large trust fund reserves
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TABLE 7-5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HIGH COST MULTIPLE AND CHANGES
IN UI RECIPIENCY
Average
Decline in UI
Recipiency
Rate,
1980-1985
(percentage
points)

Average
Decline in UI
Recipiency
Rates,
1980-1985
(percent)

-0.49

-13

-28

Next lowest 10 states

0.11

-11

-26

Middle 11 states

0.52

-11

-28

Next highest 10 states

0.92

-7

-18

Highest 10 states

1.27

-7

-18

Quintile (Ranked by
HCM in 1980)

Lowest 10 states

Average
HCM in 1980

Source: GAO (1993), Table 2.1, p.31

or very responsive tax systems. Under the present law, reserves can be
used only to pay cash benefits to UI claimants; therefore any funds
collected are not transferable for other purposes. As a result, states fear
that high trust fund balances will result in increased pressure for
benefit liberalization.
Borrowing from the federal government lessens the need to
maintain excessive balances or impose high tax rates during recession.
States' willingness and ability to borrow from the federal government
has varied over time because of federal policy changes. For example,
when the federal government began charging states interest on loans,
the increased costs of borrowing caused many states to either raise UI
taxes, reduce benefits, or both. The changes in federal legislative policy
regarding trust fund insolvency are discussed in more detail in a later
section.
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FIGURE 7-9
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUST FUND SOLVENCY AND UI
RECIPIENCY, 1947-1992
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Employer UI Taxes
States' determination of employers' tax schedules, the amount of
experience rating, and the taxable wage base reflect their implicit choice
of a funding mechanism, which can be either forward-funding or payas-you-go. A pay-as-you-go funding mechanism can either be
automatic or discretionary.
The VI program generally operated on a self-financing, forwardfunded basis during its first four decades. The past decade has seen
the system move to pay-as-you-go funding. Vnder automatic pay-asyou-go funding, states build mechanisms into their tax structure that
automatically increase tax receipts by raising employers' tax rates when
the trust fund balance declines. 14 Vnder discretionary pay-as-you-go
funding, states enact changes in their VI laws to raise the effective tax
rate on employers or the taxable wage base when the trust fund balance
becomes too low. As a result of this system, VI taxes collected per
worker vary with the economic cycle (see Figure 7-10).
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FIGURE 7-10
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAX COLLECTIONS PER WORKER
IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS, 1938-1992
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Source:
USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services.

Benefits
States can take a number of steps to decrease the number of
individuals eligible to receive benefits, as well as the benefit amounts
paid to VI recipients. There are a number of eligibility conditions that
a VI applicant faces; these conditions often overlap with factors
involved in determining the duration and amount of weekly benefits.
Among the important factors involved in determining benefit outlays
are the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Minimum earnings and duration qualifying requirements
Minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts
Method of computing weekly benefit amounts
Indexation of the maximum weekly benefit amount
Minimum and maximum duration of benefits
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Method of computing duration of benefits
Waiting period requirements
Allowances for dependents
Disqualifying income
Definition of disqualifications and the associated penalty in
terms of benefit amount and duration

Conflicting Objectives of States and Federal Government
The federal-state nature of the VI system allows states to retain
flexibility in the design of their programs, while maintaining, albeit
loosely, a national unemployment insurance policy. The system,
however, suffers from some inherent conflict between the objectives of
the federal government and those of the states.
The federal objectives under the VI program are to provide
economic stability/5 provide income maintenance to unemployed
workers, and prevent unemployment. Erosion in the effectiveness of
the VI program, as evidenced by declining recipiency and state trust
fund solvency problems, results in fewer resources being put back into
the economy. In order to ensure that broad program goals are met,
therefore, the federal government seeks to ensure that recipiency rates
and benefit payments are adequate and that states are able to remain
solvent.
States, on the other hand, are justifiably concerned with prevailing
economic and political conditions, the alleviation of economic suffering
among the unemployed, as well as the state business climate. The
regionalization of economic distress in recent years has left states with
concerns about placing their employers at a competitive disadvantage
and questions about their ability to foster economic growth within their
state boundaries. To compete for industry, new investment, and jobs,
states may seek to keep their VI taxes low in order to provide
additional incentives for businesses to locate in their state. States seek
to maintain autonomy over VI to ensure their capacity to respond to
their own economic situation however they see fit, whether it is by
controlling the size of the eligible population, the amount of benefits
paid, or the amount of taxes collected. Over time, however, tax rates
as a percentage of total and taxable wages have declined (see Figure 711). These rates vary significantly across states (see Table 7-6).
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FIGURE 7-11
AVERAGE EMPLOYER TAX RATE (AS PERCENTAGE OF TAXABLE
AND TOTAL WAGES), 1938-1992
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TABLE 7-6
AVERAGE EMPLOYER TAX RATE AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL WAGES AND
TAXABLE WAGES, BY STATE IN 1992

Rhode Island
Alaska
Oregon
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Michigan
Washington
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Idaho
Maine
West Virginia
Wyoming
Arkansas
Ohio
Maryland
Vermont
New Jersey
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Iowa
Illinois
Montana
Kansas
New Mexico
North Dakota
New York

Total

Taxable

1.95
1.71
1.59
1.51
1.45
1.37
1.32
1.30
1.28
1.16
1.12
1.12
1.04
0.99
0.96
0.95
0.93
0.90
0.87
0.82
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.78
0.76

3.51
2.65
2.63
3.06
1.96
4.03
2.26
4.01
3.23
1.74
3.18
3.01
2.19
2.36
2.80
3.24
2.49
2.03
2.04
2.19
1.53
2.46
1.18
1.85
1.53
1.46
3.26

Total Taxable
District of Columbia
California
Louisiana
Delaware
Mississippi
Minnesota
Connecticut
South Carolina
Missouri
New Hampshire
Nevada
Tennessee
Utah
Colorado
Texas
Georgia
Florida
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Nebraska
Alabama
Hawaii
Indiana
Arizona
Virginia
South Dakota

0.75
0.73
0.72
0.71
0.71
0.68
0.66
0.64
0.62
0.60
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.55
0.53
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.46
0.46
0.43
0.42
0.42
0.38
0.33
0.24

2.91
2.61
1.87
2.20
1.81
1.44

2.74
1.81
2.00
1.96
0.99
1.68
1.01

1.36
1,45
1.42
1.46
0.98
1.04

1.28
1.14
0.61
1.34

1.13
0.97
0.60

Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services.
The federal-state nature of the program also raises two equity
issues.
First, two individuals in precisely the same job-loss
circumstance may face very different eligibility, benefits, and job search
requirements based on their state of residence. While this always has

STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY

107

been true, state formulae for calculating eligibility and benefits have
become increasingly complex and more diverse over time. 16 Second,
unemployment is often concentrated geographically, which places an
uneven financing burden on the states.

FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS STATE SOLVENCY
Congress has responded to the deterioration of states' VI trust fund
solvency by passing legislation that combined fiscal relief with pressure
to initiate improvements in states' trust fund solvency. This section
outlines the most important aspects of this legislation.

FUTA Taxable Wage Base
At the inception of the program (in 1939) the federal taxable wage
base was 100 percent of payrolls. This was changed starting in 1940 to
tax only the first $3,000 of a covered worker's earnings, which covered
93 percent of all wages at that time. With each passing year, the $3,000
wage base limit covered a smaller and smaller percentage of wages as
the general wage level rose. By 1948, about 82 percent of all covered
payrolls were subject to the tax; whereas in 1969, only about one-half
of covered payrolls were subject to the tax. Federal legislation
increased the taxable wage base to $4,200 in 1972, $6,000 in 1978, and
$7,000 in 1983. These increases in the taxable wage base have not,
however, kept pace with the increase in covered wages. By 1992, the
ratio of taxable wages to covered wages had eroded to 36 percent, the
lowest level in historyP In addition, the taxable wage base is
significantly below the average annual wage, which was approximately
$25,500 in 1992.

FUTA Tax Rate
The federal unemployment gross tax under FVTA applies to the
federal taxable wage base. The federal government, however, offers
employers within a state an offsetting credit provided that the state's
VI program (1) has a taxable wage base at least as high as the federal
tax base, (2) has a maximum employer tax rate under experience rating
of at least 5.4 percent, and (3) does not have outstanding loans. The
offsetting credit provides such a strong financial incentive that every
state complies with the federal wage base.
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Table 7-7 illustrates the change in the FVTA rate and the inflationadjusted per-worker cost over time. The table includes information on
the year the change became effective, the gross FVTA tax rate, the tax
credit offset, the potential net tax rate on employers, the federal taxable
wage base, and the inflation-adjusted per-worker cost. Increases in the
net tax rate have been adopted to cover administration costs due to
inflation and to support the EB program. Tax rate increases also were
used to encourage states to raise the upper limits of their tax schedules
and to encourage increased tax revenues for reserve funds.
The
inflation-adjusted per-worker VI cost illustrates how program
administration funds have fluctuated with changes in the tax rate and
federal wage base over time.

Federal Loan and Repayment Provisions
A federal loan fund account was first established by legislation in
1944; the provision expired in 1952. No states needed loans during the
eight-year period. At that time, loans were interest-free and states with
insolvent trust funds were allowed to repay their loans slowly or not
at all. In 1954, the Reed Act reactivated the loan fund and instituted
"penalties" for late repayments. Penalties are assessed when loans are
not repaid within two to three years after they are made. 18 These
penalties require increased taxes on employers, which are used to repay
the loan debts and are assessed until the loan is repaid. The penalties
take the form of graduated reductions in the federal unemployment tax
credit allowed to employers: 0.3 percent of taxable payrolls was
assessed in the first year, 0.6 in the second, 0.9 in the third, and so on.
Because of severe unemployment, Congress allowed a three year
deferral of these penalties for states that met certain tax structure
criteria between 1975 and 1979.19 Congress passed a law that
temporarily capped the reduction in the federal tax credit at 0.6 percent
in 1981; this law was made permanent, provided that a state met
conditions regarding tax effort and indebtedness. 2o
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TABLE 7-7
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX RATE, WAGE BASE, AND
PER-WORKER COST
Federal
Taxable
Wage Base

Inflation-Adjusted
Per Worker Cost
(1992 Dollars')

Gross FUTA
Tax Rate

Offsetting
Credit

1939

3.00%

2.7%

0.30%

$3,000

$91

1960

3.10%

2.7%

0.40%

$3,000

$57

1970

3.20%

2.7%

0.50%

$3,000

$54

1972

3.20%

2.7%

0.50%

$4,200

$70

Year

Effective

Potential Net
Tax Rate

1973

3.28%'

2.7%

0.58%

$4,200

$77

1974

3.20%

2.7%

0.50%

$4,200

$60

1977

3.40%'

2.7%

0.70%

$4,200

$68

1978

3.40%

2.7%

0.70%

$6,000

$90

1983

3.50%

2.7%

0.80%

$7,000

$79

1985

6.20%

5.4%

0.80%

$7,000

$73

1992

6.20%

5.4%

0.80%

$7,000

$56

The calculation of the 1992 price index is based on 11 months of data.
Reflects a 0.08 percent increase in federal unemployment tax in 1973 only to pay for additional benefit costs.
, A temporary surtax of 0.2 percent was enacted in 1977, and was extended in 1987, 1990, and 1993. It is
now scheduled to expire in 1997.
I

1

Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services.

Congress passed legislation to revise federal loan provisions and
to charge interest on loans to states that borrowed after March 1982 and
that do not repay the loan during the same fiscal year in which the
money is borrowed,21 These interest payments cannot be made
directly from a state's benefit reserves or indirectly through a change
in a state's VI tax rate,22 Legislation passed in 1983 allowed debtor
states completely to avoid penalty taxes on employers if they paid an
amount equivalent to the penalty taxes from their reserves and met
other conditions.23 This practice allows states to finance repayment
through experience rating, as opposed to a flat tax on all employers.
Thus, as of 1983, states can defer interest payments on VI loans for
up to four years, provided that (1) their insured unemployment rate
was at least 7.5 percent for the first six months of the calendar year
preceding the interest due date (under the Tax Equity and Fiscal
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Responsibility Act of 1982) or (2) their taxes were at least 2 percent of
payroll in 1982 (under the Social Security Amendments). Vnder this
scenario, states can pay 25 percent of their annual interest payment
when due and 25 percent of the interest in each of the following
years. 24 States can also reduce their interest rates on loans and
partially freeze employer tax credit deductions.25 To requalify for
annual relief, states usually had to maintain previously enacted costcutting and tax-increasing measures, as well as initiate new steps.26
While these laws did encourage states to reverse their negative
trust fund balances, the laws have not yet resulted in a restoration of
the high reserves or HeMs (1.5 or higher) that characterized the
program in earlier years.

STATE RESPONSES TO FEDERAL ACTIONS AND
SOLVENCY ISSUES
During the 1980s, states changed their regular VI laws, often in
direct response to federal legislation and trust fund insolvency.
Overall, these changes were designed to increase the revenues collected
by the VI system, while decreasing the benefits paid by the system. In
particular:
II

II

II

Most states now set their wage base above the current federal
minimum of $7,000, and 18 states index their wage base with
the change in state annual wages.
During the early 1980s, those states that experienced the largest
decreases in their trust fund solvency also experienced the
largest increases in their effective employer tax rates.
Since the early 1980s, a number of states have implemented
solvency surtaxes that are triggered during times of trust fund
solvency problems. While these surtaxes do not eliminate the
need for borrowing, they can reduce the scale of borrowing
and slightly affect trust fund balances.
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•

During the 1980s, it became harder for unemployed workers to
qualify for VI. States increased the minimum earnings
requirements to qualify for UI, imposed stiffer qualification
requirements, and increased the penalties related to
disqualifications.

•

Many states decreased their maximum potential benefit
duration and the majority of states have either increased or not
changed their minimum potential benefit duration.

The remainder of this section discusses each of the specific state VI
law changes that have been made (primarily in the 1980s) in response
to federal legislation and trust fund insolvency and the impact of these
changes on the availability and receipt of UI.

State Taxable Wage Base
As noted above, in order to allow its employers to receive the
maximum credit against the federal tax, each state must currently have
a taxable wage base of at least $7,000. In 1981, 31 states set their
taxable wage base as low as the federally mandated level (then $6,000);
by 1987, however, only 17 states set their taxable wage base as low as
the federally mandated level of $7,000. Many states with levels above
the 1981 federal taxable wage base of $6,000 had increased their wage
base above $7,000 by 1987, with the average change among the states
that increased their base above $7,000 being 39 percent. Between 1987
and 1993, the overall increase in states' taxable wage base was 12
percent. Figure 7-12 illustrates the distribution of state taxable wage
bases, with only 12 states currently setting their base at the federal
minimum. In 1993, the state bases ranged as high as $23,900 in Hawaii
in 1993. 27 Some states have incorporated an automatic adjustment for
wage increases in the form of a flexible taxable wage base. Vnder this
method, states calculate the wage base as a fixed percentage of the
average annual wage in their state. Currently, 18 states calculate their
taxable wage base using between 50 to 100 percent of average wage. 28
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FIGURE 7-12
STATE TAXABLE WAGE BASE,1993
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Employer VI Tax Rates
Revenues from collections of state VI taxes are used to pay VI
benefits for both the regular VI program and one-half of the EB
program. States usually structure their employer VI taxes to include
several tax rate schedules. Ranging from the least favorable schedule
(which applies when trust fund balances have fallen below a specific
level) to the most favorable schedule (which applies when trust fund
balances are above a specific level), the schedule that is in effect
depends on a measure of the state's trust fund solvency. Within a
given tax schedule, there is a range of rates, with the assessed rate for
each employer varying according to the firm's unemployment
experience rating.
Declining high cost multiples have led to increasingly higher
effective tax rates on employers. Table 7-8 demonstrates that those
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states experiencing the greatest decreases in their HCMs between 1980
and 1983 also experienced the highest increase in their effective
employer tax rate. Conversely, states that experienced modest increases
in their HCM had only minor increases in their effective employer tax
rates.
TABLE 7-8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGES IN TAX RATE AND
MINIMUM EARNINGS AND CHANGES IN HIGH COST MULTIPLE

Quintile (ranked by
change in HCM)

Change in
HCM,19801983

Change in
Effective Tax
Rate,
1980-1984
(percentage
points)

Change in
Minimum
Earnings
Requirement,
1980-1984
(1990 dollars)

Lowest 10 states

-1,17

+0.87

+811

Next lowest 10 states

-0,69

+0.41

+350

Middle 11 states

-0.43

+0.30

+179

Next highest 10 states

-0,17

+0,25

+185

Highest 10 states

+0,18

+0,04

-5

Source: GAO (1993), Table 2,4, p,37,

State Solvency Surtaxes
Solvency surtaxes represent a mechanism for increasing trust fund
balances and avoiding or minimizing borrowing, These surtaxes are
triggered in a number of different ways, with the three most common
triggers being tied to one of the following: (1) a percentage of payroll,
(2) the reserve ratio, or (3) a specific trust fund dollar amount. These
surtaxes are paid in addition to the regular DI tax and have the effect
of putting a state's funding on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In 1978, only seven states had a solvency surtax; by 1983, however,
24 states had a solvency surtax. Currently, 27 states have a solvency
surtax,29 The results from a simulation model of seven states indicate
that, while surtaxes do not prevent insolvency or even eliminate the
potential need for heavy borrowing, surtaxes can reduce the scale of
borrowing and have a modest impact on trust fund balances. 3o
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Tightening Eligibility Requirements
Each state determines what requirements must be met by
unemployed workers in order to be eligible for the state's UI
program, as well as the amount and duration of benefits to be paid.
Three factors are common to most state program eligibility standards:
(1) monetary standards (i.e., minimum level of recent employment and
earnings to qualify); (2) availability for work; and (3) quit, job offer
refusal, or misconduct benefit denials. States can opt to tighten
eligibility requirements by increasing the minimum earnings
requirements level, increasing the minimum required number of weeks
worked, adding restrictions on the types of earnings that qualify, or
expanding the severity and type of disqualifications. Each of these
activities is discussed below.

Minimum Qualifying Requirements
Qualifying requirements usually specify the minimum earnings
and/ or employment duration needed to be eligible for UI benefits. 31
As either or both of these minimum levels increase, fewer people
become eligible to receive UI. Federal legislation in 1981 imposed a
minimum federal qualifying requirement of either 20 weeks, 1.5 times
high quarter wages, or 40 times the weekly benefit amount to be used
in the EB program.32 This action may have spurred some states to
adopt identical standards in their regular UI program. Between 1981
and 1987, 18 states changed their earnings distribution formula to
reduce the number of unemployed eligible for benefits. Overall, there
has been a tendency for states to (1) impose stiffer qualification
requirements, as reflected in greater use of the weeks-of-work and
high-quarter wage tests that better reflect actual employment than the
flat earnings test, and (2) increase the minimum requirement levels.
For example, in 1971,11 states used flat annual earnings and 12 states
used a multiple of high-quarter wages; in 1990, however, seven states
used flat annual earnings and 24 states used a multiple of high-quarter
wages. State qualifying formulae have become more complex, often to
screen out those individuals with weak attachment to the labor force.
States calculate a minimum earnings level each year based on their
formulae. Between 1981 and 1987, 35 states increased the minimum
earnings requirements (in inflation-adjusted terms) needed to qualify
for UI benefits; the average increase among these being 63 percent. The
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average decline in the remaining 15 states, where minimum weekly
earnings requirements decreased in inflation-adjusted terms, was 18
percent. 33
The relationship between changes in solvency and changes in the
minimum earnings requirements is shown in Table 7-8. Those states
with the largest drop in their HCM had an increase in their earnings
requirement of $811 in 1990 dollars, whereas those states with an
increase in the HCM decreased their minimum earnings requirement
by an average of five dollars.

Disqualifications
Between 1978 and 1990, 20 states increased the penalties for one or
more disqualification reasons (quitting without sufficient reason, firing
for misconduct, or refusal to accept suitable employment).34 The
penalties imposed usually specify a period of benefit ineligibility and
the earnings required to requalify. In some cases, benefit rights
associated with the most recent employment were significantly reduced,
or even canceled. The increasing use of harsher penalties makes it
more difficult for potential claimants to requalify for benefits. States
have significantly increased the instances when benefits are postponed
for the entire duration of unemployment. In 1971, for example, only 28
states postponed benefits for the duration of unemployment for
voluntary leaving, but, in 1990, 50 states had implemented that
practice. 35

Duration of Benefits
The maximum potential duration for a UI recipient varies with the
wage credits or weeks of employment. A decrease in the maximum
potential benefit duration results in some claimants exhausting benefits
earlier and therefore no longer being included in the insured
unemployed. Between 1978 and 1990, eight out of the ten states with
a maximum duration of benefits greater than 26 weeks decreased their
maximum duration to 26 weeks. 36 Approximately 22 states increased
their minimum benefit duration between 1978 and 1990, eight states
decreased their duration, and 21 states remained unchanged.
While the minimum and maximum benefit duration are designated
by state law, the actual average benefit duration is another measure of
how these laws actually affect claimants. 37 Between 1978 and 1990, 18
states experienced a decline in actual average benefit duration, which
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averaged 13.6 percent. Thirty-four states had an increase in actual
average benefit duration, which averaged 13.3 percent. Thus, the
combination of decreases in the maximum benefit duration and modest
increases in the minimum benefit duration, along with changes in the
calculation of duration, have resulted in a national increase in average
duration of 0.8 percent. This increase could be explained by a change
in the characteristics of the unemployed receiving benefits (e.g.,
reduced recipiency may result in the possibility that those individuals
eligible for benefits have stronger ties to the labor force than in earlier
years). Some increase in the average benefit duration is expected
because the average duration of unemployment spells and the
percentage of unemployed workers who are unemployed for extended
periods of time have increased throughout the last decades. 38 When
examining changes in actual duration, it is important to recognize that
even if average duration remains stable over time, the decline in
recipiency results in an overall decline in VI outlays, since fewer of the
unemployed are receiving benefits.

Benefit Levels
Many states have allowed the value of their mmlmum and
maximum benefits to decline, or at least not keep up with inflation.
Between 1978 and 1990, inflation-adjusted minimum weekly benefits
decreased an average of 33 percent in 30 states. In 10 of these 30 states,
nonadjusted minimum weekly benefits did not change between 1978
and 1990. In four states the benefit level has kept up with inflation
and, in 18 states, the minimum benefit level has increased an average
of 52 percent. Between 1978 and 1990, the maximum weekly benefit
level, adjusted for inflation, has increased in 21 states an average of 13
percent and has decreased in 31 states an average of 14 percent.
Another measure of benefits is the average weekly benefit amount,
which has fallen slightly nationwide from $169 in 1978 to $162 in 1990
(a 3.6 percent decline), after adjusting for inflation. Fourteen states have
experienced a decline of 8 percent on average, and the remaining 38
states have had an increase of 18 percent on average. Overall, as
discussed in Chapter 3, replacement rates have remained fairly constant
over time.
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Impact of State Law Changes
As discussed more fully in Chapter 4, analysts have tried to
quantify the extent to which changes in state policy account for declines
in UI recipiency. Corson and Nicholson found that 21 to 54 percent of
the recipiency decline between 1980 and 1986 was attributable to state
policy changes, and Baldwin and McHugh's results indicate that state
policy changes account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency
between 1979 and 1990, although more recent research by Baldwin
found substantially smaller effects of state policy changes. A number
of significant state policy changes were cited in these studies, including
the following: increases in monetary eligibility requirement formulae,
changes in monetary eligibility standards for minimum benefits,
increases in disqualification penalties, declines in the maximum
duration of benefits, and increases in the earnings to qualify for the
maximum benefit.
A GAO report, released in September 1993, also analyzes the effect
of state policy changes by using a combination of statistical techniques
and in-depth case studies of seven states. GAO assumed that laws do
not change instantaneously with economic conditions or changes in the
trust fund status, but that existing laws do affect current solvency.
GAO modeled the interaction among state trust fund solvency, UI
recipiency rates, state law changes, and the demographics of the
unemployed. 39 GAO's analysis found that states with declining or
insolvent trust funds took a number of legislative actions that made it
difficult for the unemployed to qualify for benefits and, consequently,
reduced recipiency.
Using different statistical and regression techniques, the staff of the
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation have analyzed the
database used by GAO, In general, their findings support the
conclusion of the GAO that declining trust fund solvency leads to
reductions in the percentage of the unemployed who receive VI
benefits. 40

POLICY OPTIONS
There are three basic policy approaches the federal government
could pursue to encourage states to improve their trust fund solvency
and maintain adequate reserve balances: (1) establish specific uniform
standards of financing and! or benefit eligibility and amount, and
require that the states achieve these standards; (2) establish broad
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financial and/or regulatory goals, and provide incentives for states to
meet those goals; or (3) do nothing. Each of these three approaches
reflects a different philosophy about the level of involvement the
federal government should have in state VI programs.
In the past, the federal government has focused primarily on a
combination of the latter two approaches. It has, for example, used
financial rewards and penalties in a number of instances to influence
state behavior. Foremost among these are (1) providing large offsetting
tax credits to employers in states that meet certain federal criteria and
(2) providing loans to states with insolvent trust funds, but charging
interest on those loans and levying tax penalties on employers in states
with delinquent loans. These financial incentives are often so
significant that the result is effectively a mandate, although the activity
is not legislatively required. The federal government has not, however,
mandated many detailed changes in states' eligibility requirements,
benefit levels, disqualification penalties, or other aspects of states' VI
programs. Nor has the federal government required states to maintain
specific reserve balances or high cost multiples.
This section discusses the following general policy options:
(1) changes in the taxable wage base, (2) changes in tax rates, and
(3) new initiatives to encourage state solvency. Under the first two of
these options, the federal government essentially mandates the specific
changes that states must make to improve their trust fund solvency.
Vnder the last option (initiatives to encourage state solvency) the
federal government sets broad goals or incentive structures, but does
not dictate specific requirements of the states.
In addition to the options discussed here, there are other
requirements the federal government could mandate that indirectly
affect trust funds solvency, such as establishing uniform eligibility
requirements or establishing minimum benefit levels across states.
Since these options would affect trust fund solvency only indirectly,
they will be addressed in a future report. Each of the policy options
discussed below vary in terms of their funding strategy (forward or
pay-as-you-go). States often prefer flexible financing options because
they allow the states to maintain lower trust fund reserves, while
responding to trust fund solvency problems. Many analysts believe,
however, that there are strong arguments against flexible financing,
including (1) the effects of the flexible policies are usually not large
enough to prevent insolvency in recessions and (2) employers are likely
to be hit with increased taxes precisely when a recession is driving
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down firm profitsY These analysts tend to prefer options that would
restore the VI system to a forward funding mechanism.

Changes in the Taxable Wage Base
Three primary options exist regarding changes in the taxable wage
base: (1) the federal taxable wage base could be raised, (2) the federal
taxable wage base could be indexed, and (3) the state taxable wage
bases could be indexed. Each of these options is discussed in more
detail below.

Raise the Federal Taxable Wage Base
One option is to raise the absolute level of the federal taxable wage
base. The current federal taxable wage base is set at $7,000, with states
encouraged to adopt a state taxable wage base of at least $7,000
through the use of the offsetting tax credit. Increases in the taxable
wage base have been legislated over time. These increases, however,
have been relatively small, and the taxable wage base has continued to
decline relative to covered wages.
An increase in the federal taxable wage base would serve to
increase state tax collections, except when (1) states already have wage
bases above the new federal level (39 states have a wage base above
$7,000 in 1993) or (2) states decrease their employer tax rates in
response to increases in the federal wage base. 42

Index the Federal Taxable Wage Base
A second option, which could be applied independently or in
combination with an increase in the federal taxable wage base, is to
index the federal taxable wage base. Increasing the federal base in
proportion with a measure of wages, such as the national average
annual wage, would provide an automatic mechanism to account for
wage increases over timeY .An alternative option is for the indexation
to be based on individual state wage increases. A similar practice is
already followed by the 18 states that currently have a flexible state
wage base automatically linking annual increases in the taxable wage
base to state wage increases.
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Index the State Taxable Wage Base
The federal government could encourage states to index their state
taxable wage bases. For example, a larger offsetting tax credit could be
offered to states whose taxable wage base is indexed to annual wage
changes in the state. This option might be particularly appealing if the
federal wage base is not indexed and/or remains relatively low
compared to covered payroll.

Changes in the Tax Rates
States currently have latitude in setting the range and conditions
of their employer tax rates, with the exception of having a maximum
employer tax rate of 5.4 percent (to qualify for the offsetting tax credit).
The federal government could be more prescriptive in what rates states
must charge their employers. For example, a federally set minimum
employer tax rate is a forward-funding option that could push states to
increase their reserves. States could also be encouraged to adopt
flexible financing provisions in the form of (1) timely adjustments
to employer tax rates given changes in the state's trust fund balance or
(2) wide minimum ranges for experience rating tax rates.

New Initiatives to Encourage State Solvency
There have also been a number of proposals made regarding
methods of encouraging state solvency. Five of these proposals are the
following: (1) national solvency standards, (2) increased interest
payments on state reserve balances, (3) new loan and repayment
provisions, (4) allowing some alternative uses of state trust funds, and
(5) permitting pooling of state trust fund reserves. Each of these
options is discussed in greater detail below.

National Solvency Standards
A number of analysts have suggested that implementing trust fund
reserve standards would improve state trust fund adequacy and
decrease the scale of future borrowing. 44 'The most likely solvency
standard is adopting an HeM standard. 'There is some controversy,
however, regarding the most appropriate target level (1.0, 1.5, or some
other multiple).
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Interest Payments on Reserve Balances
The federal government has paid interest on positive state VI trust
fund balances since the inception of the VI program. 45 To encourage
states to maintain higher reserves, the government could provide
supplemental interest payments on a portion of reserve balances in
states that maintain "large" trust fund balances or achieve designated
solvency standards. For example, a state could receive an interest rate
supplementation (such as one percentage point) on those reserves in
excess of a 0.5 HeM.

Loan and Repayment Provisions
To discourage borrowing by the states, the federal government
could increase the interest rate assessed on loans not repaid in a timely
manner. The government could also change the structure or types of
penalties assessed on employers in states that do not meet certain loan
repayment conditions.
Alternatively, preferential interest rates could be offered to states
that need to borrow when they have maintained "adequate" solvency
prior to a recession. For example, a state that maintained a specific
solvency standard could be charged a lower interest rate on borrowing
than that charged to states that failed to maintain a specific solvency
standard.

Alternative Uses of State UI Trust Funds
Allowing alternative uses of VI trust funds in states maintaining
"large" balances could encourage states to build their reserves. Any
such policy would have to be explicit about allowable expenditures
(e.g., education, training, job search assistance, VI administration,
Employment Services) and the amount of funds that could be used.

Pooling of Trust Fund Reserves
Some analysts believe that states should be allowed to pool their
trust funds so that those states that are experiencing insolvency could
borrow from those states that are not. 46 There are two basic types of
pooling. Both types, cost reinsurance and cost equalization, would
alleviate excessive costs to those states experiencing to economic factors
beyond their control. Vnder cost reinsurance, states would pay into a
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common fund and those states that experience solvency problems
beyond their control would receive payments from the fund to cover
part or all of their "excess" costs. Past benefit payments would be used
to identify reimbursable costs that are above those costs that could have
been reasonably expected. Under cost equalization, states that have
costs (or perhaps unemployment rates) above an absolute threshold
would be partially or fully reimbursed by payments from either the
current federal trust fund accounts or some other account established
for this purpose. These additional costs could be funded through
federal ill taxes.

Chapter 8

Alien Agricultural
Workers

A

LIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS include legal
permanent residents, legal temporary residents (e.g.,
aliens receiving H-2A visas), individuals residing under color of law
(e.g., refugees), and illegal aliens. Currently, FUTA taxes are not paid
on H-2A workers or illegal aliens, and these workers are virtually never
eligible for UI benefits.l
The payment of FUTA taxes on H-2A workers is currently
scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1995. Congress requested that
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommend
whether or not employers should continue to be exempt (on either a
permanent or temporary basis) from paying FUTA taxes on H-2A
workers.

TREATMENT OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS UNDER
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Agricultural workers were originally excluded from UI coverage;
however, there have been a number of legislative amendments that
have affected their participation in the UI program. The current law
(based on the 1976 amendments) extends UI coverage to employees of
farms that either (1) paid wages in cash of $20,000 or more for
agricultural labor in any calendar quarter in the current or preceding
calendar year or (2) employed 10 or more workers on at least one day
in each of 20 different weeks in the current or immediate preceding
calendar year. 2
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was
passed to control unauthorized immigration into the United States. It
contained employer sanctions requiring all employers, including
agricultural firms, to hire only U.S. citizens and any others with the
right to work in the United States. 3 Additional provisions in IRCA
were designed to (1) ensure an adequate supply of agricultural
123

124

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

workers; (2) provide certain undocumented foreign farmworkers with
legal immigrant status; and (3) streamline the existing nonimmigrant
program, while continuing to protect u.s. farmworkers from
displacement and depression of wages and working conditions. While
IRCA did not extend VI coverage to any additional classes of workers,
it extended coverage indirectly by changing the status of many
agricultural workers so that they fell into covered classes for the first
time.

RELEVANT CATEGORIES OF ALIEN
AGRICULTURAL LABOR

H-2A Agricultural Workers
An H-2A agricultural worker, as defined by the 1986 amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act, is an alien who comes to the
United States to perform agricultural work of a temporary or seasonal
nature when agricultural employers anticipate a shortage of domestic
workers. An alien worker can be used only when an employer submits
an application and the U.S. Department of Labor approves the
certification.4 Employment for H-2A workers is temporary, where the
employer's need to fill a position will last no longer than one year, and
H-2A workers must leave the country when the time specified on their
visa expires.5

Special Agricultural Workers
IRCA legalized many aliens who had worked illegally in
agriculture in the U.S. by granting them lawful temporary resident
status and, after a period of time, lawful permanent resident status
under the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program. 6 SAWs were
included in IRCA in order to allow farm owners to hire legal workers,
rather than illegal labor.

Undocumented Aliens
Some estimates indicate that approximately 10 percent of
agricultural workers are undocumented and in the United States
illegally? Many others believe that this figure is much higher.
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NUMBER OF H-2A WORKERS AND SPECIAL
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
Approximately 20,000 H-2A job certifications were granted by the
Division of Alien Labor Certification in the U.S. Department of Labor
in 1992. Table 8-1 provides a description of the number and type of
jobs certified under the H-2A program. There were 16,385 H-2A
workers actually admitted by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) in fiscal year 1992. Early projections had estimated that
the H-2A program would expand rapidly after IRCA. Because of the
large number of SAWs legalized (over one million to date) and
continued illegal immigration (despite IRCA's more aggressive
employer sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants), the number of H-2A
workers has remained at a low, stable level.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Arguments for levying the FUTA tax on H-2A workers are that the
tax (1) currently serves as the primary source of funds to cover the
costs of the H-2A certification process, (2) would increase the costs of
H-2A workers, thereby decreasing the incentive for employers to prefer
H-2A workers over U.S. workers, and (3) may increase revenues for the
UI system.
Arguments against paying the FUTA tax are that the tax would
pose additional costs on employers and, at the same time, would
undermine the insurance nature of the UI program, since taxes would
be collected even though H-2A workers are technically unable to
receive UI benefits. 8 Some also allege that the application of this tax
would increase the number of illegal aliens hired, rather than the
number of U.S. workers. It is difficult to evaluate these arguments on
economic grounds because they are based on employers' behavior.
It is unclear whether assessing a FUTA tax on H-2A workers
would, on the margin, encourage farmers to hire u.s. workers over H2A workers. First, employers already face significant costs when
deciding to apply for H-2A workers; these costs include transportation
to and from the home country, housing during employment, a flat
certification fee of $100 plus $10 per worker, and increased oversight
by state agencies. 9 Second, making H-2A workers more expensive to
employers may encourage the substitution of illegal immigrants, rather
than u.s. workers, for H-2A workers. The extent to which this would
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occur would depend on the level of INS enforcement, employers'
willingness to ignore the IRCA legislation, and the extent to which
employers can identify illegal aliens when hiring.
If policymakers seek to ensure that employers will only seek H-2A
certifications when U.S. workers are unavailable, then the issue should
be addressed more directly than through the FUTA tax. Instead of
levying UI payroll taxes, for example, the H-2A certification process
could be made more difficult, higher certification fees could be
imposed, or immigration reform and/or enforcement could be
promoted. IO
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TABLE 8-1
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991

State

Alaska

No. of
Jobs
1

Arizona

191
79
11

Arkansas

26

California

1
457
10

Crop or Activity

Origin of Foreign
Workers

Farmworking (General)

Scandinavia

Citrus (Hand Harvest)
Sheepherding
Vegetable (Harvest)

Mexico
Chile, Mexico, Peru '2:.1
India

Vegetable (Harvest)

Mexico

Horticulture
Sheepherding
Sheepshearing

China
Chile, Mexico, Peru '2:.1
Australia, New Zealand

TOTAL JOBS:
ALL STATES - 25,702

11

Work pattern for majority of custom combine crew members is to start work in
Oklahoma or Texas, and move north into other central states.

'2:.1

Majority of sheepherders work in ten (10) western states, and are primarily from
Mexico and Peru. Some workers are from Chile and Spain, with a few from China,
Mongolia and Portugal.

'§../ BWI - British West Indies. In New England states only Jamaican workers are
employed, although in 1991 some workers from the Dominican Republic were reported.
Elsewhere, the majority of BWI workers are from Jamaica. Also included in the BWI
category are workers from most of the other countries in the British West Indies island
chain.
Source: USDOL, Employment Service, Division of Foreign Labor Certificates
(1992), Table 3, pp. 9-11.
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued)
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
H-2A AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN 1991

State

No. of
Jobs

Crop or Activity

Origin of Foreign
Workers

Colorado

6
164
21

Custom Combining
Sheepherding
Sheep shearing

Canaday
Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:.1
Australia, New Zealand

Connecticut

Florida

Apple (Harvest)
Christmas Tree (General)
Diversified Crops (General)
Nursery (General)
Poultry
Sod
Tobacco (Harvest)
Vegetable (Harvest)

7,978
20

Sugarcane (Harvest-Manual)
Sugarcane (Harvest-Mech.)

Australia

Greens (Harvest)

Mexico

Farmworking (General)

Nicaragua

Irrigating
Sheepherding
Sheep shearing

Mexico
Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:.1
Australia, New Zealand

Custom Combining
Farmworking (General)

Canaday
Scotland

Tobacco (Harvest)

Mexico

Georgia

152

Hawaii

8

Idaho

Kansas

Kentucky

BWI'2.1

198
9
61
148
6
2
1,323
8

709
264
21

15
2

388

BWI '2.1

BWI'2.1
BWI'2.1
BWI'2.1
BWI'2.1
BWI'2.1
BWI'2./

BWI'2.1
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued)
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991

State

No. of
Jobs

Maine

747
45
14
2
5

Maryland

Massachusetts

3
602
16
11

6
4
12
262
213

Crop or Activity

Origin of Foreign
Workers

Apple (Harvest)
Blueberry (Harvest)
Diversified Crops (Gen.)
Nursery (General)
Vegetable (Harvest)

BWI~I
BWI~I
BWI~I
BWI~I

Vegetable (Harvest)

Mexico

Apple (Harvest)
Cranberry (Harvest)
Diversified Crops (General)
Nursery (General)
Sod
Strawberry (Harvest)
Tobacco (Harvest)
Vegetable (Harvest)

BWI ~/, Mexico

BWI~I

Scotland
BWI~I
BWI~I
BWI~I
BWI~I
BWI~I

BWI ~/, Scotland

Montana

8
55
40

Custom Combining
Irrigating
Sheepherding

Canaday
Mexico
Chile, Mexico, Peru'lJ

Nevada

3
129
95

Irrigating
Sheepherding
Vegetable (Harvest)

Mexico
Chile, Mexico, Peru'lJ
Mexico

New Hampshire

424
36

Apple (Harvest)
Diversified Crops (Gener~l)

BWI~I

BWI~I
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued)
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991

State

No. of
Jobs

Crop or Activity

Origin of Foreign
Workers
BWI ,}j, Mexico
Poland
Korea, Mexico

New York

2,862
67
3

Apple (Harvest)
Horticultural
Vegetable (Harvest)

North Carolina

682
1,490
73

Diversified Crops (General) Mexico
TobaCCO/Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico
Vegetable (Harvest)
Mexico

Oklahoma

Oregon

190
43
9

Pennsylvania

2

Rhode Island

13
3

South Dakota

6

Tennessee

Texas

197
10
73
19
1
2

Custom Combining

Canada!!, England, Mexico

Sheepherding
Sheepshearing

Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:,/
Australia, New Zealand

Grapevine (Pruning)

Czechoslovakia

Apple (Harvest)
Sod

BWI;Y
BWI}.!

Custom Combining

Canada!!

Tobacco (Harvest)
Tomato (Harvest)

Mexico
Mexico

Custom Combining
Livestock (Cattle)
Sheep & Cattle Ranch Hand
Sheep & Goat Ranch Hand

Canada!!, England
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued)
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991

State

No. of
Jobs

Utah

125
10

Sheepherding
Sheep shearing

Chile, Mexico, Peru '1/
Australia, New Zealand

Vermont

565
20
37

Apple (Harvest)
Blueberry (Harvest)
Diversified Crops (General)

BWI,£/

Apple (Harvest)
Apple (Pruning)
Cabbage (Harvest)
Goatherding
Hay (Harvest)
Tobacco (Harvest)
Tobacco/Vegetable (Harvest)
Vegetable (Harvest)
Vegetable/Berry (Harvest)

BWI '£.1, Mexico
BWI '£.1, Mexico
Mexico
Philippines
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico

Virginia

839
27
40
2
1
87
2,523
18
9

Crop or Activity

Origin of Foreign
Workers

BWI'£.I
BWI'£.I

Washington

26

Sheepherding

Chile, Mexico, Peru 2:,1

West Virginia

244

Apple (Harvest)

BWI '£.1, Mexico

Wyoming

19
19
230
88

Livestock
Sheep (Lambing)
Sheepherding
Sheep shearing

Mexico
Mexico
Chile, Mexico, Peru 2:,1
Australia, New Zealand

j

j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j

j

Endnotes
Chapter 3: Overview
1.

Employees also pay UI taxes in three states.

2. It should be noted that state and local governments, as well as
many non-profit organizations, do not pay VI taxes. Instead, they
reimburse the UI system directly for benefits paid to their former
employees.
3. Other emergency programs include the Federal Supplemental
Benefits program (FSB), which paid benefits between 1975 and 1978, and
the Federal Supplemental Compensation program (FSC), which paid
benefits between 1982 and 1985.
4. Blank and Card (1991, 1166). Baldwin and McHugh (1992) also find
results that are consistent with this conclusion.
5. Data produced by U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment
Insurance Service, Division of Actuarial Services.
6. Most states define individual benefit levels as a certain percentage
of lost earnings, up to a certain maxi-mum level. As a result, individuals
who are being paid at the maximum benefit level are likely to be
receiving a smaller percentage of their lost earnings than individuals
who are not at the maximum level.
7. In nine states, all eligible claimants have uniform potential
durations.
8. Massachusetts and Washington allow up to 30 weeks of benefits,
while Delaware allows 24 weeks.

Chapter 4: Trends in Unemployment Insurance Recipiency
1. The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants
divided by the average number of people in UI-covered employment
over four of the last six completed calendar quarters. The TUR is

133

134

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

defined as the number of all active unemployed job seekers divided by
the total civilian labor force.
2. The two ratios are comparable, but the IUR/TUR is more difficult
to interpret because of various mathematical complications.
Nevertheless, the IVR/TUR ratio is widely reported, and the IUR itself
is of particular importance because it represents the primary trigger for
federal-state EB. The specific measure of recipiency used by researchers
in examining this question has varied. Corson and Nicholson (1988)
examined both ratios, but focused upon the IV ITU, which they call the
UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined this measure,
which they call the fraction of insured unemployment. Vroman (1991)
also focused upon the IV ITU. Baldwin and McHugh (1992) also
examine IU ITU, but include EB recipients in addition to regular state UI
recipients.
3.

Falk, 1990.

4.
The IVR/TUR and IV ITU can be statistically predicted quite
accurately for the years up to 1980 by knowing only two variables:
(1) the year (a reflection of the long-term decline of the system) and
(2) the unemployment rate (because of the tendency for the ratio to
increase significantly during periods of high unemployment). Since
1980, however, the recipiency ratios no longer have the same statistical
relationship to these two variables.
5.

For more information on this issue, see Chapter 6.

6. This was particularly likely to be true for state and local
government employees, since they experienced quite low levels of
unemployment in the early 1980s.
7.

Burtless and Saks (1984, 20).

8. GAO, 1993. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the
effects of federal and state policy changes as they relate to the solvency
of state trust funds.
9.

Corson and Nicholson (1988).

10. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to rounding error.
11.

Corson and Nicholson (1988).
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12. Burtless and Saks (1984).
13. In order to facilitate greater comparability between the Baldwin and
McHugh (1992) findings and those of other studies, Baldwin and
McHugh's findings have been reformulated in the text. In particular,
Baldwin and McHugh report that state policy changes account for 97.4
percent (rather than 54 percent) of the total net change in IU ITU.
Overall, they find three primary factors that decreased the IU /TU, along
with other factors that partially offset the decrease. Thus, when only the
three factors that decrease the ratio are combined, they are larger than
the net decline. As a result, each of the factors independently appears
to be a large percentage of the net decrease. In order to determine the
relative impact of each factor, the percentage of the overall negative
impact upon IU lTU that is attributable to each of those factors that
serve to decrease IU /TU must be calculated. These calculations indicate
that state policy changes account for 54 percent of the decrease in
IU ITU, decreased unionization for 29 percent, and decreases in the
manufacturing sector for 16 percent. The remaining 1 percent is
attributable to the lagged unemployment level.
14. In part because Baldwin (1993) was released quite recently, the
research literature has not yet reconciled the variations in the Baldwin
(1993) results and the Baldwin and McHugh (1992) results.
15. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to rounding error.
16. Blank and Card (1991).
17. Burtless (1983) dismissed regional shift as a possible explanation,
but later studies have appeared to confirm the merit of this factor.
18. Curme, et a!. (1990,5-34) and Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985,497542).
19. A recent supplement to the Current Population Survey will allow
this question to be answered more definitively, but the results will not
be available for some time.
20. Corson and Rangarajan (1993) emphasize that this result is
unexpected, and suggest that it should be viewed with caution.
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Chapter 5: Dislocated Workers
1. For more information on the increase in durations of unemployment
spells, see Chapter 6.
2.
Hamermesh (1989) finds that the number of workers whose plants
close has shown a significant increase independent of the business cycle.
Summers (1986) concludes that a large percentage of the increase in the
overall unemployment rate since 1970 has been concentrated among
mature men, job losers, and the long-term unemployed.
3. Department of Labor data for 1992 show that nearly 80 percent of
workers who lost their jobs were not expected to get their jobs back.
This is the highest proportion of job losers not on temporary layoff that
has ever been recorded.
4.
Congressional Budget Office (1993) is based on data from the 1984,
1986,1988,1990, and 1992 Displaced Worker Supplements to the Census
Bureau's Current Population Survey. These supplements represent the
only nationally representative sample of individuals who have
permanently lost jobs.
5.
Congressional Budget Office (1993, 7). Unless otherwise noted, all
facts and statistics that are cited in the "Extent," "Characteristics," and
"Consequences" sections of this chapter were taken from the
Congressional Budget Office report.
6.

Jacobson, et a1. (1993).

7.
The exact time period depends upon the timing of the survey
relative to the time of unemployment for each individual.
8.
Because workers are often compensated for their company-specific
expertise, they incur losses in wages when dislocated and forced to find
new jobs. This is because company-specific expertise is of little or no
value in the new job, and is, therefore, reflected by a decrease in wages.
9.
Because the 29 week average includes unemployment spells still in
progress, it underestimates the average total length of unemployment
spells.
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10. It should be noted that more sophisticated statistical analysis
techniques show that the differences observed by job tenure do not exist
when controlling for age (Le., there is no independent impact of job
tenure after controlling for age).
11. Other smaller programs tha t are not discussed in this report include
those that were created to assist workers displaced by the expansion of
the Redwood National Park, the reorganization of several railroads into
Conrail, and the deregulation of the airline industry. Combined, these
programs total less than $2 million per year. In the decades before the
1980s, there were many other such programs, most of which are no
longer in operation.
12. Roughly 50 percent to 60 percent of the certificates are completed
within 60 days; the remainder are completed within 90 days.
13. Corson, et a1. (1993).
14. Corson, et a1. (1993).
15. GAO (1992b).
16. GAO (1992a).
17. For additional information on this subject, see Leigh (1990) and
Leigh (1989).
18. Bloom, et a1. (1993).
19. U.S. Department of Labor (1993a).

Chapter 6: Extended Benefits Reform
1.

For more detail on these changes, see Chapter 4.

2.

Corson and Rangarajan (1993, 4).

3. The increases in unemployment that accompanied the 1991
recession were heavily concentrated in 16 states (New England, the
Atlantic coast, and California). See Vroman (1993, 11). Thus, only half
of the states that appeared to most urgently require EB assistance
actually qualified for any such benefits.
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4.

Storey (1993, 24).

5.
For more information on increases in the duration of
unemployment, dislocated workers, and the programs that serve these
individuals, see Chapter 5.
6. It should be noted that such a program would not address the
structural needs of those individuals who lack the very training and
education necessary to acquire and retain a job. Because extended
benefits would be available only to workers eligible for VI, only those
who already have an attachment to the labor market would be able to
receive whatever income or training benefits might be made available
under EB.
7.
"Individual attributes" could include factors such as previous
occupation, recall status, or reason for layoff (e.g., factory closing).
8. There is, however, an interstate equity complication that arises
when the IVR is used as the trigger. This issue is discussed more fully
in the section describing the IVR.
9.

Corson, et al. (1988).

10. Johnson and Klepinger (1991).
11. Corson and Dynarski (1990) and Woodbury (1989).
12. Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Kerachsky (1992); Decker and
O'Leary (1992); Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1992); and Woodbury
and Spiegelman (1987).
13. Moffitt (1985) found that an additional week of VI offered to
workers increases the duration of unemployment by 0.17 to 0.45 weeks
for men and by 0.10 to 0.37 weeks for women. Katz and Meyer (1991)
found that an addition week of VI increases the duration unemployment
by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks.
14. Moffitt (1985) found that an additional week of ur offered to
workers increases the duration of joblessness by 0.52 weeks for men and
by 0.66 weeks for women. Woodbury (1991) found that an additional
week of VI increases the duration of joblessness by 0.37 to 0.40 weeks.
The finding that increasing the potential duration of VI benefits has a
greater impact on joblessness than on unemployment raises the concern
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that additional weeks of benefits may induce workers to leave the labor
force.
15. Unemployment Insurance Service (1993, 2-31).
16.

Bloom (1990).

17. Thus, caution should be taken to ensure that participation
requirements are significant enough that individuals who would not
benefit from the services do not participate simply to receive EB benefits.

Chapter 7: State Trust Fund Solvency
1. The tax rate includes a 0.2 percent temporary surtax. This surtax
was enacted in 1976, and has been extended in 1987, 1990, and 1993. It
is now scheduled to terminate in 1997.
2.
There are 59 separate accounts in the Federal Unemployment Trust
Fund; this chapter focuses primarily on the 53 state UI program
accounts. States' tax revenues are credited to their individual state
account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. These funds are used to pay
regular UI benefits and half of the benefit payments in the EB program.
The federal accounts include ESAA, EUCA, and FUA, as well as the
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account, the Railroad Administration
Account, and the Federal Employee Compensation Account.
3.

Vroman (1993).

4.

U.S. Department of Labor (1989).

5.

Vroman (1993, 37).

6.

Blaustein (1993, 247).

7.

Blaustein (1993, 339) and U.S. Department of Labor (1992).

8.
Vroman discusses some problems in the ability of the HCM to
measure reserve adequacy. Among them, he notes that the highest
historical 12-month period may have limited usefulnel;>s in predicting
future benefit payments, especially when states have made changes in
their UI benefit provisions (e.g., eligibility requirements, benefit levels).
In addition, the HCM ignores the ability of many states' tax laws to
respond to decreases in their UI trust fund. Vroman also noted that the
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target HCM level of 1.5 does not ensure that a state's trust fund could
not become insolvent in a given year or that a state won't need to
borrow from the federal loan fund. Nevertheless, many UI practitioners
believe the 1.5 multiple is a reasonable target, but that insolvency could
also be avoided at smaller fund balances.
9.

See, for example, Barnow and Vroman (1987).

10.

GAO (1988) and Vroman (1990).

11.

GAO (1993, 31).

12. Half of this estimate is for regular UI benefits and half is for the
Extended Benefits program. (GAO 1990.)
13. This option takes effect automatically if a state has incorporated a
flexible tax schedule into its legislation. In addition, tax increases may
occur on a case-by-case basis when a state chooses to increase
employers' tax rates.
14. Indexation of the taxable wage base is another type of automatic
financing; however, it has less to do with trust fund solvency and
instead ensures that current collections keep up with inflation.
15. This includes providing countercyclical stimulus during periods of
economic downturn and also ensuring states' ability to foster economic
growth within their boundaries.
16. Blaustein (1993, 278-282).
17. Preliminary estimate produced by u.s. Department of Labor.
18. Loan repayment must be made by November 10 of the second
calendar year after funds are borrowed in order to avoid penalties.
(Blaustein 1993, 248.)
19. To qualify for the deferral, the state's average tax rate as a
percentage of total payrolls had to exceed the average benefit cost rate
of the preceding ten years, and the minimum tax rate had to be at least
1.0 percent. Or, states had to repay a portion of their Federal
Unemployment Account loan while continuing to meet their benefit
obligations. Congress allowed this deferral to expire in 1980, primarily
because states were not repaying their loans in a timely manner.
(Blaustein 1993, 248.)
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20. In 1981 and 1982, states could limit penalty taxes by (1) maintaining
unemployment tax effort and (2) not reducing net solvency in the
program. States could limit the penalty taxes in 1981 and 1982 by not
lowering employer taxes and not raising benefits or easing benefit
eligibility. For 1983 to 1987, two additional requirements were added:
(3) maintaining a tax rate (based on total wages) of at least equal to the
prior five-year average benefit cost rate and (4) avoiding increases in
indebtedness after 1981. (Vroman 1986.)
21. The noncharging of interest was, in essence, a subsidy to debtor
states, especially in the inflationary environment of the 1970s. The
interest rate charged on the average outstanding loan balance is the rate
the federal government paid on positive state trust fund reserves (a
weighted average of all long-term and short-term federal debt) during
the first quarter of the preceding calendar year. The interest rate is
levied annually and capped at 10 percent.
22. A state that does not conform to this standard loses approval of its
VI law. (Blaustein 1993, 249.)
23. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 allowed
debtor states to avoid penalty taxes by (1) repaying current year
advances before November 10, (2) paying from reserves an amount
toward reducing its prior debt equivalent to the potential penalty taxes,
(3) having a trust fund balance on November 1 equal to at least three
months of benefits, and (4) enacting a net increase in program solvency.
24. From 1983 to 1985, states could defer 80 percent of the interest due
(to be paid in four subsequent installments) and obtain a discounted
interest rate, if they maintained their tax rate and increased their net
solvency by 25 percent in 1983, 35 percent in 1984, and 50 percent in
1985.
25. Interest rates could be reduced by one percentage point if net
solvency improved by 50 percent in 1983, or the first year the loan was
taken. In the second and third years of indebtedness, interest rates
could be reduced if net solvency increased by 80 percent and 90 percent,
respectively. (Vroman 1986,19 and 43.) Employer penalty taxes could
be reduced to 0.1 percent or 0.2 percent per year, if states met some, but
not all, federal criteria.
26.

GAO (1988, 70).
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27. From time to time, there have been proposals to increase the federal
taxable wage base. For example, in 1990, Congressman Thomas Downey
proposed the Unemployment Compensation Reform Act.
This
legislation would have increased the taxable wage base from $7,000 to
$10,000 over three years and then indexed to the growth in the average
annual covered wages after that point.
28. New Jersey calculates their taxable wage base as a percentage of the
average weekly wage, rather than average hourly wage.
29. Some states have an additional surtax to pay interest on federal
loans. Although interest-related taxes affect employers, they are not
discussed in this section because they do not affect trust fund balances.
30. Those features that affect the performance of a solvency tax include
the following: (1) threshold trust fund level activator, (2) range of
statutory (minimum and maximum) rates, (3) proportion of employers
affected, and (4) existence of both negative and positive solvency
adjustments. In order to maximize effectiveness, Vroman (1990) finds
that solvency taxes should have higher trigger thresholds, provide a
wider range of statutory rates, and apply to all employers.
31. Earnings qualifying requirements are usually expressed as a
multiple of high-quarter wages, a multiple of the weekly benefit amount,
or a flat earnings leveL

32.

Blaustein (1993, 281).

33. One state had no change.
34. GAO (1993, 22).
35. In 1971, 20 states postponed benefits for the duration of
unemployment for a misconduct discharge and 23 states postponed
benefits for the duration of unemployment for a refusing suitable work.
These numbers of states increased in 1990 to 42 and 41, respectively.
36. The states included Alaska (28), District of Columbia (34), Indiana
(39), New Mexico (30), Louisiana (28), Pennsylvania (30), Utah (36), and
Wisconsin (34). Washington and Massachusetts still have maximum
benefit durations of 30 weeks and Delaware has a maximum benefit
duration of 24 weeks.
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37. Average benefit duration is based on the regular UI program, not
the EB program or other emergency extensions.
38. See Chapter 5.
39. The state law changes in GAO's model included the average
employer VI tax rate (tax revenues as a percentage of total wages), the
VI wage replacement rate (average VI benefit as a percentage of average
wage), and the minimum earnings requirement to qualify for VI benefits.
The demographics of the unemployed included gender, race, type of job,
number long-term unemployed, unionization, and number job losers.
GAO estimated simultaneous equation systems that linked solvency,
state VI laws, and recipiency using lagged values of the HCM as a
measure of state trust fund solvency.
40. The Department of Labor was critical of the GAO report for its
reliance on case study data; however, GAO reported that their panel
database analysis supported the same conclusions of the case study.
41. Vroman (1990, 147-148).
42. Raising the taxable wage base would also increase federal tax
collections; however, these additional funds would not directly improve
state trust funds since the funds are currently designated for program
administration, the EB program, and the federal loan fund. The
increased federal tax collections could, however, help pay for any
financial incentives offered by the federal government to encourage state
trust fund solvency.
43. Applying the national increase to the federal taxable wage base
across all states inherently favors those states with very high increases
in wages (Le., they are required to put less money in their reserves
relative to the actual wage increase in their state) relative to those states
with low or negative wage annual changes.
44. Proponents of solvency standards argue that states should be
encouraged to maintain larger reserves than they do currently, primarily
because current trust fund levels are inadequate for a serious recession.
Arguments against solvency standards include possible pressures to
liberalize benefits when trust funds become large and the inability of
states to use accumulated funds for purposes other than paying benefits.
Research has shown that while requiring or encouraging a HCM at a
certain level would not ensure the solvency of a state's trust fund or that
a state would not need to borrow from the federal loan fund, the level
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of borrowing would be reduced if a solvency standard were in place.
Furthermore, a solvency standard would encourage states to return to
a forward-funding strategy.
In the past, the Department of Labor has expressed concerns about
the feasibility and necessity of adopting a reserve standard, citing the
statistical and methodological problems involved in defining a standard
and the current effectiveness of charging interest and assessing penalties
as deterrents to borrowing. (GAO 1988, 79.)
45. The interest paid is the weighted average of all long-term and
short-term federal debt during the first quarter of the preceding calendar
year.
46. Proponents of pooling state trust funds assert that regional labor
markets deviate significantly from the national labor market for long
periods of time, and that these geographic differences make interstate
arrangements for sharing VI trust fund reserves appealing. Proponents
also note that under pooling, the VI system as a whole would need
smaller aggregate reserves than when each state is solely responsible for
its own trust fund. Issues that would have to be addressed in designing
a cost reinsurance or cost equalization plan include (1) individual state
eligibility criteria, (2) definitions of "normal" benefit costs and "excessive"
costs, (3) amount of reimbursement available to states, and (4) the
funding source. (Vroman 1990, 150.)

Chapter 8: Alien Agricultural Workers
In addition, employers do not have to pay FICA (Social Security)
taxes or Federal income taxes (Medicare) on H-2A workers, which
increases the cost difference between U.S. workers and H-2A workers.
An additional issue is whether employers should be required to pay
state VI taxes on these workers. Vntil January 1996, states have the
option of excluding H-2A workers from state VI taxes. Currently, 13
states exclude H-2A workers, which results in an exclusion of
approximately two-thirds of all H-2A workers.
While the Council has not been asked specifically to comment on this
issue, it is linked to the issue of federal VI taxes. If Congress decides to
permanently exclude employers from paying FVTA taxes on H-2A
workers, it will probably continue to allow states the option of excluding
H-2A workers from VI coverage.
1.
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2. While H-2A workers are not covered by UI, they are counted when
determining whether an agricultural employer meets the wage or size-offirm requirements for coverage. The definition of an "employer"
includes a crew leader or other intermediaries, such as farm labor
contractors. Crew leaders face the same size-of-firm coverage provisions
as farm operators.
3. Fines between $250 to $10,000 are assessed for each unauthorized
alien. Repeated offenses can result in jail sentences for the employer.
(Runyon 1992.)
4. The labor certification process determines that "there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be
available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services
involved in the petition, and ... the employment of the alien in such labor
or services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions
of workers in the United States similarly employed." (US. Department
of Labor 1992.)
5. An alien may remain longer to engage in other qualifying
temporary agricultural employment by obtaining an extension of stay.
However, an individual who has held an H-2A status for a period of
three years may not again be granted that status or any other
nonimmigrant status based on agricultural activities until he or she
remains outside the United States for an uninterrupted period of six
months.
6. Aliens could apply for lawful temporary resident status under
section 210 from June 1, 1987, to November 30,1988. In order to qualify,
these SAWs had to meet the folloWing criteria: (1) resided in and
performed seasonal agricultural work in the United States for at least 90
days during the 12-month period ending May 1, 1986, and (2) be
admissible as an immigrant.
7.

U.S. Department of Labor, 1993.

8.
By the nature of their visa status, H-2A workers are allowed to
work in this country only for the time specified on their labor
certification. Unless they obtain additional contracts with approved
labor certifications, they must leave the country and, therefore, would
not be available for work. This, in turn, makes them ineligible for
receipt of VI benefits. Furthermore, many H-2A workers may not be
able to meet the state UI minimum eligibility criteria.
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9. Transportation into the United States is reimbursed after the
individual has worked 15 days and transportation out of the United
States is reimbursed only if the individual completes the length of stay
on his/her visa. There is a maximum certification fee per employer of
$1,000.
10. As part of the certification process, employers are currently
required to post the job openings with the state Employment Security
office.
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Appendix A

Extended Benefits
Reform: Principles and
Related Policy Options

I

N AN EFFORT to clarify the relationships among the EB
policy options described elsewhere in Chapter 6, as well as
the more basic programmatic goals that drive those policy options, a
brief menu of principles is presented below. Overall, there are four
mutually exclusive principles for determining the fundamental
orientation of an extended benefits program. There are then a number
of more specific programmatic principles and policy options that are
associated with each of those fundamental principles.
The overall size of the program selected from the available options
could be large or small. In those cases in which the size is large,
thereby requiring an increase over historic levels of expenditures on
extended VI benefits, the increase in costs would require the
identification of a new funding source.
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Alternative General Principles
1. Economic conditions should be the sole determinant of when
extended UI benefits are available to be paid to eligible UI
exhaustees.
OR

2. Extended UI benefits should be paid only to UI exhaustees who
are identified as dislocated workers.
OR

3. Extended UI benefits should be available based upon some
combination of economic conditions and/ or the characteristics of
individual UI exhaustees.
OR

4. Extended UI benefits should not be made available under any
conditions.
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General Principle 1
Economic conditions should determine when extended VI benefits
are available to be paid to eligible VI exhaustees.

Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted:
(1) Extended VI benefits should be made available during periods of
severe economic downturn. Such conditions are estimated to
prevail approximately (X) percent of the time.

(2) Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based
upon a measure of the percentage of unemployed individuals
among the UI-covered popUlation (Le., the Insured Unemployment
Rate).
OR

Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based
upon a measure of the percentage of unemployed individuals
among the population as a whole (i.e., the Total Unemployment
Rate).
OR

Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based
upon a measure of long-term unemployment among the UIcovered population (i.e., the rate of VI exhaustion).
OR

Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based
upon a measure of the scarcity of jobs (i.e., deviation from
employment trends).
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(3) The trigger should ensure that extended VI benefits are made
available in those (states or areas) that experience the greatest
cyclical deterioration in labor market conditions.
OR

The trigger should ensure that extended VI benefits are made
available in those (states or areas) that experience the most severe
labor market conditions.

(4) Triggers should operate on the following level(s):
(a) national, so that individuals in all states become eligible for
extended VI benefits during periods of national recession.
AND/OR

(b) regional, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI
benefits during periods of severe regional economic
conditions.
AND/OR

(c) state, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI benefits
during periods of severe state economic conditions.
AND/OR

(d) substate, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI
benefits during periods of severe economic conditions within
their local labor market.
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(5) The federal government should not require extended VI benefits
recipients to search for work.

OR
The federal government should require extended VI benefits
recipients to search for work.
(a) This should apply to all individual recipients.

OR
This should not apply to individual recipients who are
enrolled in an approved education or training program.

(b) States should be required to exhibit a minimum degree of
enforcement of the work search requirement.

OR
No minimum work search enforcement requirements should
be imposed on the states.

(6) Extended VI benefits should ,be experience rated (i.e., paid by the
previous employer).

OR
Extended VI benefits should not be experience rated (i.e., they
should be paid by society as a whole).

OR
Each state should be allowed to determine who pays for extended
VI benefits within that state.
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(7) The cost of extended VI benefits should continue to be shared
equally between the federal and state governments.
OR

(X) percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by
the federal government, with the remaining cost paid by the states.

(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state
actions).
OR

100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by
the federal government.
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state
actions).
OR

100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by
the states.
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).
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(8) Potential duration of benefits should be uniform across all eligible
individuals.
OR
Potential duration of extended DI benefits should be determined
by the following factor(s):
(a) economic conditions among the relevant population.
AND/OR
(b) the participation of an individual recipient in an approved
education, training, or job search program.
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General Principle 2
Extended VI benefits should be paid to VI exhaustees who are
identified as dislocated workers.

Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted:
(1) Dislocated workers are those who
(a) possess certain characteristics.
AND/OR

(b) participate in an approved education, training, or job search
program.
(i)

Such workers (should or should not) be required to repa.y
a percentage of training costs after finding reemployment.

(2) The cost of extended VI benefits should continue to be shared
equally between the federal and state governments.
OR

(X) percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by
the federal government, with the remaining cost paid by the states.
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state
actions).
OR

100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by
the federal government.
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(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state
actions).
OR

100 percent of the cost of extended UI benefits should be borne by
the states.
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent).

(3) Potential duration of benefits should be uniform across all eligible
individuals.
OR

Potential duration of extended VI benefits should be determined
by the following factor(s):
(i)

economic conditions among the relevant population.
AND/OR

(ii) the participation of an individual recipient in an approved
education, training, or job search program.

AND/OR

(iii) the work history of the individual recipient.
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General Principle 3
Extended UI benefits should be available based upon some
combination of economic conditions and/or the characteristics of
individual UI exhaustees.

Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted:
(1) Extended VI benefits under the dislocated worker component of
the program should be available at all times to workers identified
as dislocated.
OR

Extended VI benefits under the dislocated worker component of
the program should be available only in (states or areas) that have
activated the countercyclical component of the program.

(2) In addition, in order to define the other specific elements of the
program, some logically consistent combination of the Specific
Principles cited under General Principles 1 and 2 should be
adopted.
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General Principle 4
Extended VI benefits should not be made available under any
conditions.

Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted:
No additional Specific Principles are required under this option.
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Appendix B

Charter of the Advisory
Council on Unemployment
Compensation
THE COUNCIL'S OFFICIAL DESIGNATION

Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (hereinafter called
"Council").
THE COUNCIL'S OBJECTIVES AND THE SCOPE OF ITS
ACTIVITY
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment

compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for
improvement.
PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY FOR THE COUNCIL TO CARRY
OUT ITS PURPOSES

Four Years.
THE AGENCY AND/OR OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE COUNCIL
REPORTS

The President and the Congress.
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THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE NECESSARY
SUPPORT TO THE COUNCIL

The Unemployment Insurance Service of the Employment and Training
Administration of the Department of Labor.
MEMBERSHIP

The Council shall consist of 11 members as follows:
(A) Five members appointed by the President, to include
representatives of business, labor, State government, and the
public.
(B) Three members appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member
of the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(C) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman and the
ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives.
(D) The President shall appoint the Chairman of the Council from
among its members.
(E) In appointing members under subparagraphs (B) and (C) above,
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall each appoint(a) one representative of the interests of business,
(b) one representative of the interests of labor, and
(c) one representative of the interests of State governments.
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE DUTIES FOR WHICH THE COUNCIL IS
RESPONSIBLE
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment

compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for
improvement. Not later than February 1, 1995, the Council shall submit
to the President and the Congress a report setting forth the findings
and recommendations of the Council as a result of its evaluation of the
unemployment compensation program, including the Council's findings
and recommendations with respect to determining eligibility for
extended unemployment benefits on the basis of unemployment
statistics for regions, States or ,subdivisions of States.
THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS IN DOLLARS
AND STAFF YEARS FOR SUCH COUNCIL
It is anticipated that expenditures will be approximately $1,200,000,

including six FTEs.
THE ESTIMATED NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF COMMITTEE
MEETINGS
It is anticipated that the Council will meet five times during each year.

TERMINATION DATE

January 31, 1996.
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Appendix C

Council Calendar
November 15, 1991

Establishment of Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation by
statute.

January 24, 1992

Chartering of Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation.

May 11, 1993

First Counci~ Meeting Postal Square
Building, Washington, D.e.

September 20, 1993

Public Hearing Southland Center
Hotel, Dallas, Texas

September 21, 1993

Second Council Meeting Southland
Center Hotel, Dallas, T~xas

December 9, 1993

Third Co~ncil Meeting Postal
Square Building, Washington, D.e.

January 10, 1994

Focus Groups of ill Claimants
San Francisco, California

January 11-12, 1994

Fourth Council Meeting and Public
Hearing Sheraton Palace Hotel
San Francisco, California
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Public Hearings

T

HE COUNCIL held two sets of public hearings in order to
offer a w~de spectrum of individuals and organizations the
opportunity to provide their views and recommendations on improving
the Unemployment Insurance system. Hearings were held in Dallas,
Texas on September 20, 1993, and in San Francisco, California on
January 11 and 12, 1994.
The public was asked to address a number of topics related to
Unemployment Insurance and what can be done to improve the
system.
To date, 44 witnesses have presented testimony before the Council.
In addition, written statements were submitted by a variety of
individuals and organizations. Both the hearings and the written
statements proved to be a rich source of information, providing many
new perspectives on the issues in our charter. The Council expresses
its appreciation to the members of the public who shared their thoughts
with us.
In order to encourage broad-based participation both with respect
to regions of the country and diversity of perspective, the Council plans
to hold additional hearings as it continues with its work.

WITNESSES PRESENTING TESTIMONY
Stephen Bingham, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation
Malcolm Bonner
John Bourg, Louisiana AFL-CIO
Debra Bronow, State of California Employment Development Department
Larry Clark, Gibbens Company
Brenda Cochrane, San Francisco State University
Loleta Didrickson, Illinois Department of Employment Security
Eunice Elton, Private Industry Council of San Francisco
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James Evatz, JCPenney Company, Inc.
Terry Evert, Gibbens Company
Roger Gette, Legal Services of North Texas
Mary Katherine Gillespie, California Rural Legal Assistance
Bruce Goldstein, Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc.
Robert L. Harvey, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Charles Howarth, Council of State Chambers of Commerce
John Humphrey, Employment and Training Administration - San Francisco
James Jackson, Texas Employment Commission
Thomas Jackson
Patrick Johnston, California State Senate
Bob Kenyon, Employment and Training Administration" Dallas
Laurie B. Larrea, Private Industry Council of Dallas
David Lien, San Francisco Department of Social Services
Larry A. Malo, State of Washington Employment Security Department
Rodolfo Mares, Jr., Legal Services of North Texas
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis
Dave Murrie, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission
National Employment Law Project
Nils L. Nordberg, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training
Diana M. Pearce, Women and Poverty Project
Don Peitersen, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment
Donnie Potts
Tom Rankin, AFL-CIO
Cynthia Rice, California Rural Legal Assistance
Ted B. Roberts, Texas Association of Business
Carol Ross-Evans, California Tax Payers Association
Rashan Sanchez, San Francisco Department of Social Services
Emmett Sheppard, Texas AFL-CIO
Liston L. Thomasson, Mississippi Employment Security Commission
Donald Vial, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy
Judy Villa, Bank of America
Don Villerejo, California Institute for Rural Studies
Richard Virgili
Christine Worthington
Stephen Yelenosky, Legal Aid Society of Central Texas
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Council Staff
Laurie J. Bassi, Executive Director
Stephen A. Woodbury, Deputy Director

Ellen S. Calhoun
Amy B. Chasanov
Janice C. Davis
Daniel P. McMurrer
Robert Pavosevich
Esther R. Johnson, Designated Federal Official
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Additional copies of this report may be obtained by making a written
request to the following address:
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Suite 5-4206
Washington, D.C. 20210
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